

The
**American Expeditionary
Forces**

*Its Organization and
Accomplishments*

HARBORD


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MAJOR GENERAL JAMES G. HARBORD

The
**American Expeditionary
Forces**

*Its Organization and
Accomplishments*

By
MAJOR GENERAL JAMES G. HARBORD
U. S. Army, Retired List

EVANSTON PUBLISHING COMPANY
1929

FOREWORD

67/5/16
THE remarkable and outstanding career of Major General James G. Harbord is one which has demonstrated both his versatility and his thoroughness. Engaged at the center of world activities in responsible relations during the last twelve years, his writings reflect that high perspective, from which standpoint great events must be discussed if their full meaning is to be clear to the layman and to those who were not in authoritative contact with them.

There is no one reading General Harbord's lecture at The Army War College in February of this year, the first article in this book, who will not gain from it better ideas of the organization of the American Army in France and the measure of its accomplishments. Upon the other subjects he discusses in this volume similar enlightenment will be received.

The addresses of General Harbord have not heretofore been collected and published so as to be properly preserved in permanent form. With a realization that these documents, so valuable to the historian and informative to the public, may in their present form not receive the study and attention they deserve, I am printing a few of the more important of them for distribution.



Evanston, Ill., March 12, 1929.

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Outline Biography of Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord U. S. A. (Retired List)

After thirty-four years of service in the United States Army, Major General James G. Harbord retired in December, 1922, to become President of the Radio Corporation of America. Although without experience in civil commercial life, General Harbord was not a stranger to Big Business. During the closing months of the World War he commanded the Services of Supply of the American Expeditionary Force in France, probably the largest business enterprise in history.

During the nineteen months of America's participation in the World War General Harbord was successively Chief of Staff, A.E.F. under General John J. Pershing, Commander of the Marine Brigade at Belleau Wood, Commander of the Second Division in the Soissons Offensive and finally Commander of the Services of Supply. This cycle of war service was the culmination of a long and colorful Army career.

Harbord was born at Bloomington, Ill. March 21, 1866, son of George W. and Effie Critton (Gault) Harbord. While he was still a child his parents removed to Lyon County Kansas. After finishing his elementary education in the public schools, the youthful Harbord walked sixty miles to Manhattan, Kas. and there entered Kansas State Agricultural College, from which he was graduated in June, 1886.

He taught school for a time in Butler County, Kansas, and later returned to the Agricultural College as an instructor. January 10, 1889 he enlisted in Company A, Fourth Infantry, U. S. A. He served as an enlisted man in Washington Territory and Idaho, rising through the grades of private, corporal, and sergeant of Company to Quartermaster Sergeant of the Fourth Infantry.

On July 31, 1891, as Number One of the class appointed from the ranks that year, he was promoted to Second

Lieutenant and assigned to the Fifth Cavalry. He served with that regiment in the Indian Territory, Kansas and Texas, and was a distinguished graduate of the Infantry and Cavalry School in 1895.

The Spanish-American War found Lieutenant Harbord in his early thirties, with ten years of rigorous Army training behind him. Early in 1898 he received a commission as Major in the Second United States Volunteer Cavalry, the Torrey Rough Riders. But when his picturesque outfit was assembled, it was not sent to Cuba. When it was mustered out of service that autumn, after a typhoid season in Florida, he returned to the regular army, receiving a First Lieutenant's commission with the Tenth Cavalry. After service in Alabama and Texas he went to Cuba where, as Adjutant General, Departments of Santiago and Puerto Principe, and Eastern Cuba under General Leonard Wood, as Military Governor, he served from April, 1899 to May, 1901. He was promoted to Captain, 11th Cavalry February 2, 1901.

A brief period in Virginia followed his return to the United States. For eight months, during the latter part of 1901 Captain Harbord was assistant Chief of Insular Affairs, under General Clarence R. Edwards, in the office of Secretary of War Root.

He went to the Philippines in March 1902 and remained nearly twelve years, serving as Chief of the Moro Constabulary, and of Southern and Central Luzon, and later acted as Chief of Philippine Constabulary.

His service with the Philippine Government terminating under the operation of the "Manchu Law" January 1, 1914, Harbord returned to the United States. He was assigned to the First Cavalry, with which he served, as Captain and Major in California and Arizona from January, 1914 to September, 1916.

May 14, 1917, shortly after America's entrance into the World War, Harbord was selected by General Pershing to accompany him to France as Chief of Staff, A.E.F.

With General Pershing and his staff Harbord sailed for France May 28, 1917. For nearly a year, or until May 6,

1918, he worked with General Pershing at Paris and Chaumont, creating the organization and machinery through which the American Expeditionary Force was later to function with such conspicuous success. In the meantime, in August, 1917, Harbord was promoted Brigadier General, National Army.

General Harbord was assigned to the Marine Brigade, Second Division May 6, 1918. He commanded the brigade with distinction in the Verdun Sector, during the fighting in the Bois de Belleau and at Bouresches, during the stand of the Second Division near Chateau Thierry, which stopped the German advance on Paris in June, 1918.

Promoted Major General, National Army, and assigned to the Second Division, Harbord commanded it during the Soissons Offensive, in the battles of July 18 and 19 when it out-stripped the French Colonials in its thrust through the German lines.

General Pershing assigned Harbord July 29, 1918 to command the Services of Supply, the great organization through which men, munitions and supplies were cleared through the French seaports, the training areas and bases up to the front line. He directed this important work through the closing months of the war, resuming the post of Chief of Staff, A.E.F. in May, 1919. In August, 1919 Harbord went to the Near East as head of the American Military Mission to Armenia, to which he had been appointed by President Wilson.

Returning to the United States in November, 1919, General Harbord was again assigned to Second Division, commanding at Camp Travis, Texas, until his appointment in July, 1921 as Deputy Chief of Staff, U. S. A.

In the meantime General Harbord had been promoted Brigadier General, Regular Army November 30, 1918 and Major General, Regular Army September 9, 1919.

In his final report as Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General John J. Pershing recommended that the permanent rank of Lieutenant General be conferred upon seven officers "for exceptionally distinguished service in the field under circumstances involving great responsibility to the na-

tion." Among those recommended for this honor was Major General Harbord who had also been recommended for Lieutenant General by Pershing in October, 1918.

On November 18, 1922, the Secretary of War approved the application of Major General Harbord for retirement from active service on December 29, 1922 to become President of the Radio Corporation of America January 1, 1923.

General Harbord has received the following decorations: Distinguished Service Medal, U. S. Army; Distinguished Service Medal, U. S. Navy; Knight Commander, St. Michael and St. George, Great Britain; Commander, Legion of Honor, France; Croix de Guerre (with two palms) France; Grand Officer, Order of the Crown of Belgium, Commander, Order of St. Maurice and St. Lazarus, Italy; Grand Officer, Prince Danilo, Montenegro; La Solidaridad, Panama, Grand Officer, Polonia Restituta, Poland.

A Year as Chief of Staff of the American Expeditionary Forces

ADDRESS AT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE,
FEBRUARY 8, 1929

Introduction by Major General William D. Connor, U. S. A., Commandant The Army War College

Gentlemen: I have never found any difficulty in introducing the speakers who heretofore have addressed The Army War College from this platform, but this morning I find myself somewhat embarrassed in that I must introduce a speaker under whom I served in close association during two years of the stress and strain of war in France. If I were to say what I really think, I should expose myself to the charge of flattery, if not of bootlicking; if I said any less, I should despise myself for such arrant cowardice. Under these difficulties I have decided to say nothing except that it was, in large measure, a compensation for the war to have known and served under Major General James G. Harbord, twice Chief of Staff of the American Expeditionary Forces.

IT is worth notice that when chosen for the command of the American Expeditionary Forces in 1917, General Pershing was the outstanding example in our service of promotion by selection. The patriarchal system of promotion does not produce such men. Eleven years had passed since his promotion from Captain of Cavalry to Brigadier General. Time had justified his selection over the heads of many seniors and had softened the disappointment of those who had once felt themselves injured by it. While the youngest of our Major Generals but one, and only his senior by six weeks, General Pershing when named for France at fifty-seven was in the prime of his maturity. Since the days

of Washington no American General has been given supreme command in war with such unanimous endorsement and concurrence by his contemporaries as was enjoyed by General Pershing. By physique, diversified experience, trained native judgment and temperament, he was without a serious rival when chosen for the command in 1917. Since Washington no other American General has exercised supreme command throughout an entire war. No other American soldier has ever commanded under circumstances of such difficulty as faced General Pershing on the Western Front; none has exercised command with more credit to himself and more far reaching results to our country.

When General Pershing went to France not even the Allies believed that we should ever land and support an army of sufficient strength to be a factor in determining the war. He had to stand to those Allies in the place of an Army until one could be created and sent to him. Under conditions without precedent in our history, and inherent in a foreign country itself straining to the utmost, he had to weld together the parts that were to constitute his great Army. With every harbor in France crowded to its limit, his troops were largely to depend upon ports and facilities built by his own engineers. Where every inch of railway and every car were urgently needed by the French and British he was obliged to create the system that should supply his Army. The brilliant galaxy which he later gathered round him to constitute the ablest General Staff that has ever served our Country, had as a nucleus, but six officers who accompanied him across the sea.

Making war on French soil, the exigencies of American home politics did not allow him even to acknowledge the French, British and Italians as Allies but merely as Associates. When finally permitted by President Wilson to associate himself in council with the Allied Chiefs, his personality held its own in situations where Prime Ministers saw no impropriety in agreement with him and cabling contrary instructions to their Ambassadors in Washington almost before the echo of their friendly acquiescence with him had died away. Against the most urgent appeals to hurry his

untrained troops into the line he stood like a rock until they were at least fairly prepared,—the single exception being the historic offer to Foch after the route of the British 5th Army in March, 1918. Under tremendous pressure to amalgamate our men in the armies of our Associates and submerge their identity as Americans, he stood firm for the creation of an American Army. Our country has never,—can never,—repay him for the pertinacity and far-sighted wisdom with which he insisted upon an Army under our own commanders. It is not too much to say that this attitude made it possible to end the war in 1918. Our losses were heavy enough, but thanks to Pershing our men died under the shadow of their own flag, or survived to victory under officers of their own blood and tongue.

You Gentlemen of the Army War College, can easily understand, I think, what it meant to me to serve as the principal staff officer to such a Chief, and that the years spent under his direct command are to me the years of my life the most worth while in peace or war. The relations of a Chief of Staff to his Commander are, perhaps, not quite paralleled by any other human relationship. In the British service he is Chief of the General Staff but no more. With us he is the Chief of the entire Staff. The Chief of Staff of our entire military establishment, representing the Constitutional Commander-in-Chief and his Secretary of War, both of them civilians generally unfamiliar with the mechanism and detail of command; uncertain possibly, as to the powers and channels of military authority, is in many essentials differently situated from the Chief of Staff serving with the active virile Commanding General of field Armies in War. These differences vary, also, with the distance from the War Department, as for example with the width of an intervening Atlantic plus some hundreds of miles of continental Europe. No text-book can fix the exact powers of such a Chief of Staff. Certain co-ordinating authority is inherent in his office. An aggressive personality will perhaps assume authority to the limit of his commander's tolerance. But in general his authority flows from and is measured by the con-

fidence reposed in him by the Chief in whose name he gives orders.

The circumstances of his arrival in France many months in advance of American troops in such numbers as to demand much of his personal attention; the basic and fundamental relationship of the staff work of the first few months to his ultimate problem; and perhaps, to some extent, the caution born of lack of experience on both sides, inevitably constituted General Pershing his own principal staff officer during the organization period of the American Expeditionary Forces, and made his Chief of Staff in more than the usual sense his Deputy or Assistant.

History is not without instances of staff officers shining by more than the reflected glory of an able or brilliant Commander whom they served. Blucher had his Von Gneisenau; some have even attempted to divide credit between Napoleon and Berthier; between Ney and Jomini. Grant had John A. Rawlins who, entirely without military training or experience, dominated at least some of the human failings of his great General. No such comparisons will arise in the minds of future historians with regard to either of the men who served General Pershing in this capacity. Their loyalty was given in such unquestioned measure to his commanding personality, and they so identified themselves with his conception of their mutual duty in connection with the problems that confronted the American Expeditionary Forces, that such credit as may be due them, is forever and inseparably interwoven with the success of General Pershing and the triumph of the American arms.

Events crowd upon events as years begin to wane and in a rather busy life for the past few years, I have given little thought to those stirring days of 1917 and 1918. My effort today to give you some of my experiences as the first Chief of Staff of the American Expeditionary Forces will tell the story in very imperfect and inadequate measure. My tour as Chief of Staff covered the voyage to France, the period of organization, of inauguration of training, and the entry of the 1st, 2nd, 42nd and 26th Divisions into the line.

On May 14th, 1917, as a student officer here I was at

luncheon in the upper story where in those days we ran the mess, when a telephone message informed me that General Pershing wished to see me at the War Department at two-thirty that afternoon. I had first known him in December 1898, had eight years later crossed the Pacific with him, and during the last few years of my Philippine service had often met him in Manila or Mindanao. I was aware that he had come to Washington from San Antonio where he had taken over command upon the death of General Funston. I supposed, that in view of our entrance into the War a month before, he had probably been called here with the intention of appointing him Chief of Staff, as General Scott was to retire for age in less than six months. As I made my way to the War Department that afternoon I concluded that possibly something was to be said to me about my failure to call on the General and pay my respects,—a courtesy which might have been expected from our previous acquaintance,—and I had no excuse to give other than that I had not wished to distinguish myself by conspicuous attention to an officer about to be made Chief of Staff.

When I reported and the usual salutations had passed, the General told me he had been selected to go to France and wished me to go with him as Chief of Staff,—coupling with this statement an inquiry as to whether I spoke French, to which I was obliged to reply in the negative. He said he thought that either the Commanding General or his Chief of Staff should know that language. My ignorance of it seemed to hang my detail in the balance, but he added that he would take me along in some capacity or other, and to come over into Room 223 and we would get to work. Several days later, without warning, he remarked that he had considered two other officers for the duty, and asked me what I thought of them. I hesitated to reply under the circumstances and said so, but he urged frankness, and I then admitted that I thought I could do the work better than either of those he had named. That left the appointment still in abeyance until, on May 26th, the order assuming command announced me as Chief of Staff. I held the place until May 6th, 1918, when I was succeeded by that splendid

man and fine soldier, Major General James W. McAndrew, whom I in turn again succeeded on May 25th, 1919, to enable him to become commandant of the Army War College. General McAndrew's untimely death in 1922, leaves me as the surviving officer who held the position during the active life of the American Expeditionary Forces. When on August 20th, 1919, I was sent by the President to the Near East, General Fox Conner relieved me and accompanied the Commander-in-Chief to America and remained with him until the General Headquarters were discontinued a few months later.

When we entered the War in April, 1917, General Pershing, fresh from his Mexican Expedition, was the only officer of our Army who had commanded as many as ten thousand men in the field, which was the strength of his command in Mexico. There was not a general officer on the list who was less than 57 years of age. No living American officer had ever served as Chief of Staff of a greater force in the field than ten thousand men. The General Staff itself was still unsteady from the crisis through which it had passed less than a year before. On the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916, the Judge Advocate General, one of the ablest lawyers who has ever held that place, and who a year later was to play such a distinguished part on the stage of the World War by his Administration of the Draft Act, had rendered to the Secretary of War an opinion in construction of the new law. This emasculated the General Staff of all workable authority and would have sent us into the World War with much the same lack of coordination we suffered in 1898. Fortunately for our country, a greater lawyer occupied the position of Secretary of War. Few single acts of Newton D. Baker's great career as a War Secretary meant more for our Country than his official disapproval of the destructive opinion so rendered him. His lucid interpretation of the law preserved to him his military advisers in the conflict which was soon to demand the supreme efforts of the greatest military establishment that America has ever known.

The myopic vision of the War Department of what lay

before us in France was shown by the reluctance with which staff officers were furnished us at the beginning. Embarking for the greatest war of all time, there were some officers performing duties "too important" to admit of their being spared for a mere war. The Field Regulations of 1914 provided for three sections of the General Staff. Majors John McA. Palmer and Dennis E. Nolan were detailed from the War Department General Staff, and from stations outside of Washington General Pershing secured Captains Hugh A. Drum, Arthur L. Conger and William O. Reed, who became members of the General Staff of the American Expeditionary Forces and joined us before departure. In all about fifty officers of all grades and departments, including a number of medical and other reserve officers, sailed with General Pershing for France on May 28th, 1917. For long after our arrival abroad requests for additional officers were grudgingly granted in the light of the numbers we had taken with us; and, in the preparation of this paper, I have read an approved history which states that General Pershing took an "ample staff" to France.

Several days before we left the War Department General Pershing and I tried our hands independently on drawing up a letter of instructions to govern him in his new command. We then telescoped these two into a single letter which General Bliss, Acting Chief of Staff in the absence of General Scott, signed and delivered to the General. On taking leave of the Secretary of War the day we left, he also handed to General Pershing a signed letter of instructions, drawn, as I have understood, by General Kernan, then Assistant to the Chief of Staff. Thus we had two letters of instructions equally authoritative where they did not conflict, and between them the ground covered was ample. They went to France in my personal custody and remained in the office safe of the Chief of Staff of the A.E.F. for the period of the war. I doubt if a dozen persons outside this audience are aware that there were two such letters.

Our voyage on the Baltic witnessed the beginning of staff studies as to numbers, organization, equipment and necessary tonnage. The decision was reached to adopt the

French seventy-five instead of retaining the American three and a half inch field piece. Construction became the duty of Engineers instead of Quartermasters. Another decision taken en route made the Air Force independent of the Signal Corps to which in America it still belonged. Studies on probable tonnage covered experiences of various armies from the 39 pounds per soldier of Sherman's March to the Sea, to the daily fifty pounds of freight per soldier which the British calculated for the Western Front. Building railroads, ports and docks, dredging harbors, importing standard locomotives and freight cars as we expected to do, it seemed that a hundred pounds of freight per day per soldier was a fair estimate for us, or fifty thousand tons per day for the million men, of whom we were then already beginning to dream. Consideration was given to the probable ports that would be available for our use, realizing that the Channel ports would be denied to us and that the ordinary commerce of France had been diverted to her west coast. Meantime our ideas were expanding as we neared the theater of war. Officers whose official lives had been devoted to economy in government expenditures were to be faced with the necessity of quick decision in the spending of many millions. On the intellectual and professional expansion of all of us was to depend our avoidance of the scrap pile.

It required no previous experience to see that certain staff problems appeared to demand almost simultaneous and immediate solution. These were the Organization for the divisions that were about to be formed in the home country; the constitution of our General staff and the allocation of its functions; the order of priority of shipment of troops and supplies including munitions; the organization of what we then styled a Line of Communications; the training of the troops that were to come; the system of supply from the Line of Communications to the troops; the strategy of our future combat employment. Incidental to these were numerous others, among them none of more ever-recurring insistence than our relations with our Allied Associates, and with the different missions and agents from the Land of the Free who were already appearing in France. One of such agents,

destined to lose his life in the German advance of March 1918, had committed us to retaining twenty thousand aviation personnel in England, before General Pershing saw him for the first time. On the implications in one aspect of our relations with the Allies seemed to hinge almost the entire program which I have just indicated.

Marshal Joffre no longer a factor on the Western Front, but the completeness of whose relief from authority and responsibility in military matters was not yet realized, had just been received by our people with an enthusiasm not enjoyed by any other visiting Frenchman since Lafayette's return in 1824. He urged the Plan de Nivelle, and although General Nivelle was relieved and discredited before we reached France his Plan survived his fame. In modified form it persisted to within a few hours of the Armistice. This Plan desired American participation in the War to take the form:

1. Of sending thousands of laborers, railroad and otherwise, carpenters, miners, chauffeurs, foresters, etc., but no fighting troops.

2. That such combat troops as might be sent for moral effect or to save our national face, should come as recruits to be fed into depleted Allied battalions, losing their identity as far as American control and leadership was concerned.

General Bridges, a gallant British Division Commander, heading a Mission to America coincident with that of Joffre and Viviani, cherished the same ideas but thought the British should get their share of the men. It is difficult to discuss the relations of the A.E.F. with our Associates without repeated reference to their efforts to merge our men into their units and make impossible an American Army under its own commanders. It was what Britain had not dared to do with her Canadians, Anzacs or Indian troops. The French had not attempted it with their Senegalese, Moroccans or other Colonial troops. It had the advantage of placing our inexperienced men under war-trained though alien officers; of preserving the existence of Allied Battalions otherwise to be disbanded as man power grew scarce; and it would minimize our influence or deny us a voice in the eventual peace negotiations. It took no account of political conditions in this

country, or of differences in language and customs and diet, nor of national pride, nor of the history and traditions of that great conflict between our states which furnished more lessons for the World War than were derived from any other source. It ignored the professional attainments and such native leadership as American officers may claim to possess, and had twice demonstrated against one of the Allies. I desire to dismiss this subject without further reference and have brought it up now, only because it is evident that it had a determining influence on what we were about to begin planning. With nothing above an American battalion organization, the question of brigades, divisions, of the proportions of artillery to infantry, or auxiliary troops, was not one that should concern us. Neither was a great General Staff needed. The priority of troops and supplies became the problem of some other staff than the one we should have to create.

But the hours of persuasive talk that aggregated into months, the efforts of Allied Ambassadors in Washington, the constant manoeuvring of our Allied Comrades in arms, including the final efforts of Foch and Henry Wilson in the last days before the Armistice had no effect on General Pershing's ultimate purpose. With his determination thus made, it was evident that the first task which awaited the Staff was to recommend the proper organization for the troops that were to constitute our Armies. The situation was the more urgent because, coincident with the arrival in Europe of General Pershing and his staff, there came a Mission of twelve officers under the presidency of Colonel Chauncey B. Baker, Quartermaster Corps, under orders to visit the Western Front and also report upon a proper organization for our troops. Though the responsibility of command was to rest upon Pershing, this Mission did not report to him. There at once rose the danger of conflicting recommendations between a Mission personally reporting in Washington and a Commander submitting his views by cable from Europe. Our study of organization was made under high pressure in order to permit of comparison with that made by the Baker Mission. There had been for many months an American Mission attached to the French Armies,

consisting of Colonel James A. Logan, Majors Frank Parker, Marlborough Churchill, William Mitchell and James R. Church. It was an extremely intelligent and highly professional group of officers and their views were of great use at this time and later. When the Baker Mission reached Paris two days were spent with it by General Pershing and his Staff in reaching an agreed recommendation, which was forwarded to Washington on July 11th, 1917. I doubt if any two days of our stay in France were more profitably spent. The result was the organization with which all of you gentlemen are familiar, and in which many of you won distinction.

Given an organization for the fighting troops, and the General Staff set-up claimed priority of attention. Coming through London we had four days to study the British staff organization from the War Office standpoint. Officers were now sent to both British and French Headquarters to make staff studies. General Pershing and myself together visited the headquarters of General Petain and of Sir Douglas Haig. Each Headquarters was anxious to make proselytes for its methods. The French were in their own country; the British were like ourselves an Expeditionary Force, though much more blue water rolled behind us than beats upon the white cliffs of Albion. I have always felt that our A.E.F. General Staff was a happy composite of what was best in the traditions of three armies. With the similarity in language, and considering the origin of our regular army, it was probably inevitable that our staff should eventually resemble the British somewhat more closely than the French. It is worthy of note, in the light of our contrary experiences between 1903 and 1917, that during the life of the American Expeditionary Forces there was the closest and most harmonious cooperation between the General Staff and the Adjutant General. It furnished the basis for the organization approved by General Pershing for the War Department in 1921.

It was quite evident that the three General Staff sections of Combat, Administration and Intelligence provided by our Field Regulations of 1914 were inadequate. The

French had four divisions in their General Staff, the British three. We decided upon four, but almost at once created a fifth because of the importance of the work to be assigned to it,—the training of our armies to be. General Pershing approved the Staff organization for General Headquarters only tentatively, and it was not until the following winter that it took final form and designation. As created in the summer of 1917 it comprised an Administrative, an Intelligence, an Operations, a Coordinating and a Training Section. Under the Commander-in-Chief's instructions a Board of Officers presided over by Colonel Hagood was convened by me in February 1918 to study and bring in recommendations as to any modification in the Tentative Staff Organization. Upon its advice the assignment of Staff functions at G.H.Q. was made as follows:

First or Administrative Section: Ocean tonnage, priority of overseas shipments, replacement of men and animals, organization and types of equipment for troops, billeting, prisoners of war, military police, leaves and leave areas, welfare work and amusements.

Second or Intelligence Section: Information regarding the enemy, including espionage and counter-espionage, maps and censorship.

Third or Operations Section: Strategic studies and plans, and employment of combat troops.

Fourth or Supply Section: Coordination of supply services, including construction, transportation, and medical departments, and control of regulating stations for supply.

Fifth or Training Section: Tactical training, schools, preparation of tactical manuals, and athletics.

These were given the short designations of G1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, which have passed into our military history.

With the combat organization determined, and the staff functions assigned to appropriate sections of a General Staff, the immediate duty of the Chief of Staff became more one of coordination and supervision of the work now to be done by the several sections.

The complete organization project for the services of the rear with statement of the troops necessary for supply services was forwarded on September 18th. This visualized the great terminals and vast installations for receiving, handling and delivering troops and supplies, which were to

enable America to do her part in the crisis of 1918. By October 7th schedule of priority of shipments, divided into six suggested phases was enroute to the War Department. The general organization project, that for the services of the rear, and the schedule for priority shipment, formed the basic plan for providing the American Expeditionary Forces with the men and materials for combat and supply. Meanwhile the Intelligence was establishing its contacts and plans; schools and training were being organized and the study of the strategy of the Western Front was going on under the responsible Assistant Chiefs of Staff as they were now coming to be known. The Strategical Plan, to which our subsequent operations were to closely adhere, was prepared and approved in principle by September 17th, 1917.

Naturally, a machine of that complex nature put together for the first time did not always function smoothly at first. The summer of 1917 was a difficult one for all of us. Official lives more than once hung by threads. In the hurry and urge of war quiet workers sufficient to themselves and the day's duty, settling their own problems, were less in the official eye than officers of a different type. Not many can successfully work with one hand and beat a drum with the other,—though human nature being what it is,—some try it. In other days staff officers were given a definite mission. This was not often practicable now for none of us had the experience to be all-seeing, and to fix a definite objective for expanding problems. Many were far-reaching in their implications. Officers had to be given a situation with the expectation that they would do all there was to be done, and follow it to a logical conclusion, without more definite instructions, and generally without further guidance or more than desultory supervision. No one working under my supervision was expected to take to a superior for decision any matter that he was officially competent to settle for himself. Powers not specifically reserved to higher authority were vested in subordinates. It can hardly be otherwise under such circumstances. Time did not permit the Comander-in-Chief or his Chief of Staff to become submerged in an ocean of detail. The latter held daily morning meetings in his

office for the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, the Adjutant General and Inspector General. He heard the statements of progress made and difficulties encountered, if any, and gave such instructions or advice as were due. At these meetings we discussed the military situation as shown on the maps of the Intelligence Section. The Chief of Staff gave out such news as was of general interest, including probable movements of the Commander-in-Chief who spent much time on the road in those stirring days.

Our Field Service regulations of 1914 contemplated war in our own country and divided it into the Theater of Operations and the Zone of the Interior. The first was under the Commanding General in the Field; the latter directly under the War Department. A Line of Communications ran from a Base Section receiving supplies from the Zone of the Interior to an army in the field. It had also an Intermediate and an Advance Section. The Commander of the Line of Communications had a staff and jurisdiction similar to the Department Commanders of pre-war days. At each of the Section headquarters he had an Assistant Chief of Staff who gave orders in his name, he personally retaining the nominal command. With the arrival of the first troops from America we established such organization, designating St. Nazaire as Base Section No. 1, an Intermediate Section with headquarters at Nevers, and an Advance Section with headquarters at Neufchateau. Very soon it was realized that arriving divisions and special arms would some of them require to be trained near the Base Sections. There was need for territorial commanders exercising court-martial jurisdiction. It was evident that the Commanding General Line of Communications could not personally command Base Sections which speedily grew around Bordeaux, in England, at Le Havre and Brest, and later at Marseilles, and eventually in Italy and Antwerp, in the last days of the war. Section Commanders were substituted in each Section for the Assistant Chief of Staff.

Much study was given to the location of intermediate depots, the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff visiting the sites of Gievres and Montierchaume before deciding. The

study of the strategy of our employment already foreshadowed the location of these great installations on the railroads leading from the ports of St. Nazaire and Bordeaux, through Tours, Dijon, Nevers and Is-sur-Tille towards Northern Lorraine. Is-sur-Tille was destined to become our principal regulating station and a great clearing house for supplies for our front.

It was already foreseen that ocean tonnage would become the most valuable commodity in the world, and that our supply lines from America would have to be supplemented by supplies obtained elsewhere. The Commander-in-Chief visualized an organization which should comb neutral and Allied countries for supplies and relieve the pressure on American and borrowed tonnage. He placed in charge of it, as General Purchasing Agent, Colonel Charles G. Dawes, destined in post-war days to high political honors, and who has deserved them all. His organization secured a dozen pounds of needed supplies of all kinds for every eight that crossed the seas from the home country.

The American soldier when we entered the war owned his own clothing; his Company Commander still submitted Clothing requisitions and Ration returns. By a General Order of December 1917, and prepared by Colonel W. D. Connor, the Regulating Station made its initial appearance in our military literature accompanied by its partner the railhead. The system of daily automatic supply was established, by which all supplies were classified, and furnished to troops according to the number of individuals known to be present. Clothing thereafter belonged to the Government instead of the soldier. Salvage came into our military nomenclature. Red tape, which is the popular name given to army procedure in our country, by the civilians who create it, began to disappear.

In the early summer of 1917, after the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff had visited British G.H.Q., consideration was given to their handling of transportation matters. Our Field Regulations contemplated Military Railways as a function of the Engineer Corps, but left ships and other forms of transportation in the Quartermaster Depart-

ment. An Engineer Mission composed of eminent civilian engineers was already making a study of the railway system, ports, etc. of France. It was headed by Major William Barclay Parsons, Engineer Reserve Corps, one of the best known engineers our country has produced. Among its members was Major William J. Wilgus, Engineer Reserve Corps, who at the age of thirty-five had been Vice President and Chief Engineer of the New York Central, a man to whose vision the American Expeditionary Forces owes much. Both Parsons and Wilgus were Colonels before the end of the World War. While General Pershing was considering transportation a cable from the Acting Chief of Staff in Washington said that the Pennsylvania Railroad had very patriotically placed the services of their Operating Vice President, Wallace W. Atterbury, at the disposition of the Government to organize our transportation in France, on condition, however, that he report directly to the Commander-in-chief and receive orders from no one else.

General Pershing at once replied pointing out the impossibility of this arrangement; that the ordinary channels for the transmission of instructions would have to apply, as it might not always be convenient for transportation matters to wait for personal attention of the Commander-in-Chief, even a battle might sometimes intervene or interfere. He said that no such conditions should be accepted, and hearing nothing more for a fortnight, supposed the matter ended. One afternoon a card came in from the outer office to where I was in conference with the C-in-C. and it bore the name of W. W. Atterbury. The Pennsylvania, as time proved, had given us its best, and a railroad man without superior in the country. But he had been allowed to come under the conditions he had imposed. He had heard of the red tape of the regular army; of the supposed overbearing and arbitrary character of regular army officers and the impossibility of civilians dealing with them. The Transportation Department was created with Mr. Atterbury, who was made a Brigadier General in October, as the Director General of Transportation. To it was given the task of unloading the transports, transporting the supplies and men by rail to

where needed, with no intervening authority between General Atterbury and the Commander-in-Chief. At each port there was a Transport Officer taking orders from a distant Director General, and entirely independent of the Base Section Commander whose men he used to unload his transports and reload the cars for the interior. In this independence was included also, the construction of storage, etc. and building of railroads. This impossible arrangement limped along until August 1918, when the Transport officer was placed under the Base Section Commander at each port, and the Transportation Corps, as it had now been named, took its place in the military hierarchy as any other auxiliary service. This worked so well that in retrospect it has the hearty acquiescence and support of General Atterbury and all that staff of able and loyal railroad men who followed him to the war. The regular army and its General Staff have a staunch friend in the veterans of the Transportation Corps.

In no country in Europe of which I am aware do the officers of the Supply branches have quite the same standing and influence that they do in our service. For generations before 1903 our staff and supply bureaus in the War Department had acknowledged no common superior but the Secretary of War. The chiefs of the Supply branches in the American Expeditionary Forces bred in that kind of an atmosphere, cherished the right of direct access to the Commander-in-Chief whose staff officers they were. By the winter of 1917-18 the full number of chiefs of one sort or another claiming the right of direct consultation with him had grown to nearly two dozen. The demands on his time and the time lost by them in waiting for a chance to see him and the delays in business held up for his personal decision, were visibly adding to his burdens and slowing up the military machinery. Something had to be done to relieve the C-in-C. of the enormous burden of routine administration and supply, and head it in to some other coordinating authority. There was so much independence among the supply branches that the system lacked a sufficient definition of supply responsibility. The Supply Chiefs were opposed

to moving from Chaumont or to any plan which erected barriers between them and General Pershing. There was considerable loose talk about this time of the need of some great strong silent dollar-a-year man to take over the whole supply business and run it after the manner of our great private commercial enterprises.

The same Board which made the study on the allocation of General Staff functions was empowered to consider this phase of our difficulties. It did so and brought in a recommendation that the Chiefs of the Supply services, retaining their titles and authority as members of the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, should exercise their functions in the matter of procurement, transportation and supply, under the Commanding General, Service of Supply, by whom such activities would be coordinated. This left with the General Headquarters at Chaumont, the General Staff, and of the Administrative Staff Chiefs, the conspicuously efficient Adjutant General Robert C. Davis, the knightly Inspector General Brewster, a survivor of the finest type of the Old Army of the pre-Spanish war days, and the safe and conservative Judge Advocate Bethel. The Adjutant General's records and his hundreds of clerks went to Bourges. All of this was approved by General Pershing, and the Supply Chiefs were moved to Headquarters of the Service of Supply at Tours, each leaving a representative in the appropriate General Staff Section at General Headquarters. The Board had accomplished a two-fold object of providing a single and direct line of responsibility for all matters of supply while utilizing to the utmost the services of the experienced and able Chiefs of the Supply branches hitherto stationed with the Commander-in-Chief in Paris and later at Chaumont. The relief to General Pershing's time and the increased efficiency of the Supply branches were almost instantaneously evident. The plan could hardly have failed to work well when it was loyally supported by the cooperation of such men as Williams and Rice, Ireland and McCaw, Russel, Langfitt, Jadwin and Patrick. The only official voice raised against it was that of one very ambitious and able Assistant Chief of Staff at G.H.Q. in the closing days of the War. As

it was organized and it was operated, it should form the model for any future war in which our country may engage if under circumstances of over-seas supply similar to those which confronted us in France.

In the never-ending conferences with our Allied Associates, particularly with the French because they were represented at our Headquarters by a more numerous Mission than our British friends, there was no subject which received more attention and stirred deeper feeling for the first year of our stay in France, than that of Training. Military students of pre-war days had known that hasty entrenchments were a development of the American Civil War, and were an adjunct of open warfare. The Trench warfare that developed after the First Battle of the Marne led to special training and in giving it both sides appear to have accepted permanent stabilization as a feature of the Western Front, and neglected training for any other kind of war. The poor results gained in repeated Allied offensives had strengthened this habit of thought. The casualties among the commissioned strength of both British and French had well nigh eliminated the professional officer with whom they began the War, those who survived being now principally found in the high grades. The military public opinion of both armies was now largely formed by men who knew no other kind of warfare than that in which their dearly bought experience had been won. No such conditions had affected military thought in America where trenches were not looked upon as anything new or abnormal, or as having replaced the war of movement. Our associates were of the opinion that the training of our troops should be concentrated upon trench warfare.

General Pershing steadfastly maintained that training in minor tactics was a necessary part of the training of the company officer. His view was that the war could never be won until one side or the other climbed out of its trenches and moved forward, and that the moment that happened the officer must conduct his unit, even if it be nothing more than a squad, according to the time-honored principles of open warfare. When the Germans began to drive the Fifth

British Army in March 1918, they took the fight into the open, and it became known that they had for months been practicing for such warfare while the Allies still limited their training to trench warfare. The spring and summer of 1918, lengthening into autumn, brought a complete vindication of the American system of training. It was notable that at the crisis when American troops were to be thrown into the battle the fighting of the World War was changing back to the system of tactics with which the American armies had been trained,—well described by General Pershing himself, as “the development of a self-reliant infantry by thorough drill in the use of the rifle, and in the tactics of open warfare.”

And now this paper has drawn out to great length. Perhaps I have left you wondering just what part I had, or may think I had, in these now historic accomplishments of the American Forces, and more particularly in those of their great General Staff. At the distance of over ten years I sometimes ask myself that question. The answer will have to be left to some other than myself, if indeed, it is necessary that it ever should be answered. For a year it was the life I lived, the theme of my waking hours, the substance of my dreams in sleep. We all lived it. I was not the hub of those activities but I was never far from that center, and I was more than a wooden spoke. I cannot claim to have been their inspiration, for that was our great Commander, but with the remainder of his staff I breathed its spirit. Mine was not perhaps the guiding hand, but the lever and throttle sometimes felt its more or less gentle touch. I was present at innumerable conferences with and without our General, at Headquarters, in the field, in France and in England. The French Mission headed by the soldierly General Rageneau generally came first to me and tried out its well-nigh daily arguments on the points on which we differed, and together we awaited the pleasure of the Commander-in-Chief. Later we returned to my office and they sprung on me their never ending and naive propaganda from new and unexpected angles. Besides my independent visits to American units in and near the line, I went with the General to French and British

headquarters and fronts, and accompanied him on more than one tour of the ports and service of supply. We were together in London when the agreement was signed in April of 1918 for bringing over in British shipping nothing but infantry and machine gunners for a period. Together we saw the French attack on the Chemin des Dames in October 1917. Together also we visited the Canadians and agreed with Sir Arthur Currie on certain peculiarities of our British cousins.

In the panorama of memory there pass before me the soldierly and courtly Haig, the less polished but very able Sir William Robertson, the volatile and seldom serious Henry Wilson, Lord Milner whose reputation, made in Egypt, belonged to a previous generation, the half American but entirely British Winston Churchill responsible for the Napoleonic conception of the Gallipoli Campaign but not for its failure, the wise and erudite Haldane, Lord Derby sometime War Minister and sometime Ambassador of Great Britain to France, Lord Brooke descendant of Warwick The Kingmaker, Rawlinson, Plumer, Harrington, Birdwood, Byng, Butler and Monash, all of them soldiers worth remembering; the wily and unstable Lloyd-George, the King and Queen and the young heir to England's crown. In France I had the opportunity to know many of the distinguished men of that race which was willing to perish from the earth rather than yield its soil to the blonde invader; Marshal Foch, Petain a general whom I regard most highly, Clemenceau, Poincare, great old Castelnau, royalist, Catholic and aristocrat and by those facts denied the baton that should be his, Buat who passed away two years ago as Chief of Staff of the French Army, Gouraud with the gallantry and bearing of a soldier of the Empire, Viviani the William J. Bryan of France, Joffre in his retirement, the keen Weygand around whose birth hung the romance of a royal house, the restless and untiring Tardieu, good but difficult old Payot whose conversations with General Dawes were historic in their rivalry of bad English and worse French, and never-to-be-forgotten, our own de Chambrun, de Marenches and de la Ferronnays. So too there passed a

pageant of our own statesmen, Senators by the brace, Congressmen by the dozen, President Wilson himself and his great War Secretary Newton D. Baker, whose support of the A.E.F. was constant and unflinching; the great financier James Stillman, James Gordon Bennett nearing the end of his stormy career, that fine old southern gentleman and diplomat Thomas Nelson Page, Secretary Lansing, Colonel House, General Bliss, Henry White, Herbert Hoover, and many another played a part on our A.E.F. stage, for that brief moment when the ensemble, except the soldiers, gathered before the curtain in the last act.

And what shall I say of that staff which worked for and with me in that trying first year in France? I doubt if any army was ever more intelligently and diligently served than by that group of brilliant officers—Assistant Chiefs of Staff—who, during that time, so well served ours. Logan of the First Section, Nolan of the Second, Palmer of the Third until his health gave out and he was followed by Fox Conner, William D. Connor of the Fourth until the Spring of 1918 when he joined the 32nd Division; Malone, Chief of the Training until the winter of 1917-18 when he joined the 23rd Infantry and was waiting in the Second Division for me when I went to the Marine Brigade, and Frank R. McCoy, Secretary of the General Staff, who went to the Rainbows in that eventful springtime to command the old 69th New York. All of the men I have named became general officers except one, and he in my opinion not the least deserving, has since won eminence in other fields to the loss of the service which used but did not reward him. Of these men and their successors Eltinge, Andrews, Moseley and Fisk, with whom may be appropriately included Drum, Heintzelman and Craig, the efficient chiefs of staff of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies, and their associates of the staff, the Commander-in-Chief himself—never extravagant in praise—has said: "This body of officers, both as individuals and as an organization, have, I believe, no superiors in professional ability or loyalty."

The American effort in the World War took little root in the imagination of our countrymen. The censorship did

its work thoroughly and well. It was a war of another age than the one in which our fathers fought. It was fought far away and in a foreign land. It furnished no legendary heroes, no Jeb Stuarts, Phil Kearneys, Custers, Hancocks, or Phil Sheridans. The purple mists of song and story have not yet begun to lend their generous inaccuracy to its deeds. Perhaps they never will. Of the more than two million men who went to France you may expect to find now perhaps one survivor in every average group of sixty Americans who may come together in these days of peace. But a thousand memories throng the hearts of those of us who had a part in its accomplishments, and to those of us in middle life or later, nothing else will ever seem quite so much worth while. Much was expected of the American Expeditionary Forces and they made good.

The Army as a Career

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IT is a delicate matter to offer advice concerning the choice of a career. The selection of his life work is an intimate personal problem for the young man. It is easy for an elder generation to intrude upon this intimacy, and to rudely ignore the romantic visions of youth, from the practical viewpoint of age and mature knowledge.

Ours is a material age and Americans are particularly accused of being a "material" people. We alone have very great national wealth in a world now discouraged and discontented, and many of our young men appear to make the acquisition of wealth their chief aim in life. Such men confound the aim with the means of its achievement. Under the history of most of our great fortunes, however, lies a record of accomplishment. The youngster who wins his way from poverty to riches must have energy, enthusiasm and ambition. He who strives only for gold may lose the treasure that was his inheritance. Accomplishment is truly the American aim, and success must accord with the Christian ideal of service. Men's lives are their answers to the question of destiny, and America has called those lives great which have been of greatest service to mankind.

In this word *service* lies the measure of a career. To youth peering forward through the obscurity of inexperience the necessity of service in his own life is not always apparent, nor its meaning clear. If he will believe that *service* is not a compulsory process of subordinating his own aims but is rather the means which will enable him to achieve them, he can pursue his ambition with a minimum of the confusion and stumbling which are often the experience of youth. In groping for the answer to what is a career, I conclude that there are as many careers as there are men and women. There is, however, a common denominator of

success for all, and in this sense, the successful career is *Service*.

In choosing a life work the normal young American of good physique, proper home training, and average attainments, has early to elect between the pursuit of mere wealth with the power it brings, and a career of accomplishment with less of material reward. If thoughtful, and capable of weighing considerations before making a choice, he will probably decide for or against an Army career in the light of answers to such questions as these:

Will it be congenial employment? Shall I like it?

Does it offer sufficient remuneration to enable me to live decently, to marry, and raise the family to which every normal young American should look forward?

How does its opportunity for a service to country and humanity balance as against a career of commercial activity with the power that attends success in business life?

What opportunity does it offer for distinction, for fame, for such accomplishments as will make my name live beyond me?

The reply to the first of these questions is so much a matter of individual taste that it may only be answered by the youth standing at the threshold. The old Army life so dear to our frontier days, of a small selected community socially sufficient to itself, of summer Indian scouting and winter garrison schools, of long isolation on duty in the distant west with an occasional leave of absence and return to eastern civilization, is a phase of our history which has passed with the buffalo and the blanket Indian. It was a life of romance and adventure where survived something of the chivalry of a by-gone age, and in which the lives of fair women and brave men were sweetened by mutual dependence and self sacrifice. The last of those who knew it and loved it are now at an age when all the associations of youth are fast receding in the purple haze of memory. In its place have come tours of duty in the Philippines, Panama, Alaska and Hawaii, stations near the larger cities, and much service

with the citizen soldiery. So much of the future duty of our regular Army officer in time of peace will be with the National Guard and Organized Reserve that he can hardly expect more than two years with regular troops in each grade as he climbs the commissioned ladder. The posts with regular troops will be small, and the social activities will depend upon the nearest city rather than on the garrison life which was so attractive in the Old Army. His brother officers will still be gentlemen—for the traditions of "An Officer and a Gentleman" have stood the test of time, and outlasted many storms of legislative displeasure. Duty, Honor, Country, are still the watchwords of the regular service,—as the record of many a gallant officer, and many modest headstones in our national cemeteries and among the hills of France bear witness! !

On duty detached from troops the officer will find himself quite often the associate of civilians whose individual incomes far exceed his own. Since the World War the necessities of national economy have imposed upon the regular Army much hardship through enforced life in temporary camps and cantonments. There are today many Army families living in unpainted, unplastered, wooden buildings erected in 1917 for an average life of three years, and located in more or less barren and unattractive surroundings. These hardships are less felt, however, than would be the case in civil life, for the entire military community shares the same fate, and are spared comparisons with wealthy neighbors. One result of such adversity shared together is to intensify the wonderful association which is perhaps the most lovable feature of Army life. Many an old wooden gymnasium once used to train the great over-seas Army, or old Liberty Theater in which the Welfare Workers entertained the homesick recruits of 1917 and 1918, now lends itself well to decoration, and witnesses within its dingy walls hospitable occasions graced by gentle Army women. The enjoyment of such gatherings is not destroyed by the flavor of a Spartan environment.

One of the interesting phases of Army life has always been the care-free manner in which an entire Army com-

munity submits to being transplanted from the midst of a city to the frontier, or to tropical wilds, without much disruption of its social activities, and even with an increased development of camaraderie. When the nation returns to normal financial prosperity, and the reaction in Congress which follows each of our wars has once more spent itself, the proper housing of the regular Army will doubtless receive its due attention, and conditions which are now disgraceful to our country will be remedied.

No man who yearns for sheltered ease and the fleshpots is apt to adopt a military career. He who seeks the companionship of gentlemen and gentlewomen, and the attractions of a disciplined and orderly life, will find them in the army. For one who enjoys working with men in the open, with occasional opportunity for foreign duty, and the constant knowledge that he is preparing himself and those he commands to serve his country in her time of need, I know of no career more attractive than that of the American Army officer. The profession of arms is one of the oldest, and there is none more honorable.

The remuneration of the army officer is quite moderate. He frankly is not as well paid as some branches of skilled labor, nor so liberally remunerated as many positions in civil life above the grade of laborer, but which demand less of education and character than does the army. The compensation of a Major-General after twenty-six years of service, including all allowances may not under the law exceed nine thousand seven hundred dollars per year, less the liberal subtraction for income tax. A lieutenant in his first three years of service receives per year some twenty-three hundred dollars, including all allowances. Formerly army pay corresponded to rank and was presumed to increase with added responsibility. It is now based upon length of service, and does not necessarily correspond to either grade or responsibility. At the discretion of the President it may be slightly varied each year to correspond to the rise or fall of the cost of living. There are fairly liberal allowances for quarters when not furnished in kind, and certain increases for grow-

ing family responsibilities. Medical attendance is free for members of the army and their families.

The average young man is apt to gauge a place by its remuneration and, from the foregoing, army pay may not seem attractive. With the army system of retirement, however, the pay may be considered in the nature of income drawn upon the investment of a commission. The problem of saving for old age does not have to be solved in quite the same way that it is by the civilian. Insurance can safely be carried since steady pay is not threatened by sickness or absence from duty. In case of physical incapacity for active service due to accident or broken health, the army officer is retired for life upon three quarters of the pay he is drawing at the time of such retirement. At the age of sixty-four he is similarly retired. After thirty years of service he may on application be retired at the discretion of the President, and after forty years he can demand it. If an officer dies while on the active list his widow will receive a small pension; if he dies after retirement the law provides no such pension. There is therefore the continual urge of economy throughout life, and constant facing of the fact that there is no other class of public servant from whom so much is expected in proportion to his pay as is exacted from the army officer.

The matter of pay is important when the officer contemplates marriage. In many walks of life wealth is the measure of the young man's ability to support a family, and determine his eligibility in the minds of the potential father-in-law. This is not so literally followed in the army. There the rewards are of a different sort and it is the unworldly fashion of the service to prefer reputation to riches, and honor to opulence.

A commission in the army gives the entry to as good society as there is in the world, and since there is frugality demanded of all, there is little competitive dressing or spending. There is no station of our modern life in which there are relatively more happy marriages than in our good American Army. In mere statistics army marriages stand next to the bottom in divorce ratios. In these days of the

high cost of living no army officer can maintain a family on his pay without practicing close economy, but in normal times while lacking luxury, the life is comfortable. The delightful associations of army life make up in a measure for the lack of luxury. Service has its compensations.

The army career compares well in its possibilities for service to country and humanity, with the power and opportunity that attend success in business life. The modern army officer must be a composite of business man, lawyer, statesman and priest, as well as soldier. There is a popular misconception as to the usefulness of an army career due to the belief that because soldiers are dressed alike, and drilled in masses, they are therefore stamped in a mold which crushes originality and initiative. There must be in the military organization discipline and teamwork, each with his own hopes and ambitions, and his own ideas of accomplishment. It is this development of individuality which has distinguished the American soldier above those of other countries, and which indeed is principally responsible for the success which attended our arms in the World War. The common tie among our soldiers is the sense of service. Their discipline during the World War was largely a self-imposed code founded on their belief that it was necessary in order to accomplish that for which they had come to France. In the Army one serves the country while finding at the same time an opportunity for development along a chosen line.

In the long uneventful drowsy days of peace between our Spanish American War and the stirring times of nineteen seventeen, the average American citizen thought only of his regular army as an organization which was comfortably housed in military posts whose original location had been due to something connected with Indian wars and frontier protection, or as standing guard at picturesque and rather useless old forts, conveniently situated with reference to fashionable summer resorts along the seacoast. He understood that it drilled a little, danced a good deal, paraded on national holidays, and performed a number of other vague and unimportant duties,—all at considerable cost to the taxpayer. If it be true that the ideal self-government

can only come through knowledge, the average American citizen's pre-war knowledge of his regular army would have entitled him to little participation in those historic institutions through which he thinks he governs himself.

With the coming of the Great War, the transformation of our young manhood into the great National Army, largely to be commanded and administered by officers trained in the regular army, brought home to the average citizen the fact that in the regular establishment lay much of its hope for success in the great military adventure which our country was undertaking beyond the sea. A year's contact on the Rio Grande border during the threatened trouble with Mexico had brought the National Guard and regular army into closer understanding than had ever before existed in their history, and has strengthened their mutual esteem. The regular army as the repository of the military traditions of our country, the exponents of the latest military teachings of the world; with the indispensable habit of discipline, and long experience in handling soldiers, enjoyed the confidence of the citizen soldier to a higher degree than ever before.

The national administration wisely kept high army appointments out of politics when we entered the war, and to a larger extent than had been the case in our other wars made its appointments in the higher grades on a merit basis. It was thought as wise to keep the highest command in the hands of the regular army as it is to appoint only lawyers to the Supreme Court, and to keep only experienced navigators on the bridge during a storm at sea. The war ended so quickly after we began to get our divisions to France in effective numbers that there was little opportunity for that rise to distinction through the actual practice of war, which during any long conflict in which our country has hitherto been engaged, has always brought to high rank our best type of citizen soldier. Consequently the command-in-chief, the army, corps, and the majority of the division and brigade commanders were officers of the regular army. So too, in the higher grades of the staff, the leaven of the mass came from the regular establishment. The strength and support

brought to our military establishment, both in the army and the War Department, through the splendid men which came to it from every field of business and professional life, can never be calculated. It was the support of her gallant sons which has never failed our country in her time of need, the memory of which may well alleviate the indifference that still half stuns the demobilized soldier in this land of short memories and brief regrets. With all this array of business and professional training at the disposition of the high command, and the rallying of our incomparable young manhood to the colors, the intelligent direction which the regular army was able to give to our military effort resulted in a share of the credit for the final triumph of the Allied arms, the assessment of which we may confidently leave to history.

Since December 1918 when the victorious armies of the Allies marched to the Rhine, the presence of our contingent there, though small in numbers, has been the strongest steadying influence for peace in that war-weary region. Its attitude has been that of a mediator, seeking to allay misunderstandings and irritation, and so conducting itself as to reflect credit on the American name. The hauling down of our flag from the silent fortress of Ehrenbreitstein in January last, closed at least for the time, our military adventure across the Atlantic,—the greatest the world has ever seen, in which the nation transported its men by millions across three thousand miles of ocean, and counted the cost in billions as well spent in a good cause.

From the days of Lewis and Clarke, in the first years of the nineteenth century the development and settlement of our country was largely through the agency of the regular army. It conducted practically all the preliminary explorations. It constructed the early roads, built bridges and canals, conducted the surveys and made the maps in the winning of the west. Army engineers initiated most of the accurate methods now employed in our geodetic, topographic and hydrographic surveys. When our pioneers went west they traveled routes laid out and constructed by the army, and were protected by its frontier stations. They settled on lands surveyed by it, and the validity of their titles rested

on such surveys. The linking of these outposts of civilization with the east was accomplished through railroads located and in many cases constructed by the army. Up to 1855 practically all railroads in this country were projected, built, and sometimes operated by our military establishment. The Baltimore and Ohio, the Erie, Northern Central, Boston and Providence, the New York, New Haven and Hartford, and the Boston and Albany were thus located, constructed and initially operated. An army officer built the best locomotive of his time, after his own designs. Another was chosen by the Russian Czar to build the railroad from Moscow to St. Petersburg. He died before its completion, but a brother officer carried his work to successful termination. The army built the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, and the old Cumberland Pike from Maryland to Missouri. Practically all our federal and state boundaries were surveyed by it. The Washington Monument, the wings and dome of the national capitol the old Postoffice building, the Government Printing Office, the Library of Congress, the War College, the Agricultural Building, the Washington Aqueduct, the parks of the Districts of Columbia are the work of military engineers. Army engineers supervised the Lincoln Memorial. Their part in the river, port and harbor development for a century past is well known, and these activities are still going for a century past of a coordinated scheme for the entire country. They are studying present commercial facilities, the hinterlands which can be served, their proper development, and the factors which advance or retard their progress.

Within the present generation our country has faced the problems,—always difficult for a representative government,—of new possessions. Alaska, Hawaii, Cuba, Porto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, and the Canal Zone have each presented their problems, and the major part of the solution has been directed by or through the regular army. In the Klondyke it was the army that opened the harbors, and built the roads and trails leading to the gold. It surveyed their lands and policed the frontiers. The link which bound the Klondyke to civilization was the cable laid

and operated by the army. The Philippines, Hawaii, Cuba, Porto Rico and Panama all have histories of achievement, history in which the forces of civilization have struggled against reaction and backwardness. That civilization is triumphant is due largely to the constructive work of our regular army. Building up public utilities, eradicating decimating diseases, educating the children, creating institutions of self-government, and protecting such institutions from retrogression, in all these the regular army left its record of the day's duty well done. These are generalities true of all lands where our flag has flown outside of our continental limits.

To particularize as to Panama, we made success out of the failure of our predecessors on the Isthmus. The Canal was built under the worst possible initial conditions of sanitation, and in the face of tremendous engineering difficulties. In the last four months of 1922 our government collected a million dollars per month in canal tolls. Seventy-five great steamship lines served the world through the Panama Canal. Its equipment as a base for fuel, repair and supply is complete. Incidentally it is a tremendous military asset for national defense. As long as it remains in our possession it doubles the value of our Navy, though its total cost was only approximately that of ten modern battleships, with an average life of ten years before overtaken by obsolescence. Our occupation already exerts a powerful influence over the neighboring nations to the south. They are beginning to undertake necessary improvements under the stimulus of increased prosperity brought by the Canal. The building of the Canal was a monumental accomplishment worthy of any nation in any age.

So much for the peace-time opportunity for service to mankind and country which the army afforded its officers in the era ending with our entrance into the World War. After the Armistice the cry of American Relief stirred the army in France almost as had in other days the slogan of Westward Ho!! Except for the titular head, and some minor officials and employes, the American Relief in Europe after the Armistice consisted of three hundred and twenty

officers and nearly five hundred enlisted soldiers constituted the missions and agencies which distributed relief. In addition a great amount of convoy, and courier service, and much handling of supplies was done by the American Expeditionary Forces. The American Relief was little more than an army activity. Russian Relief has been a similar activity whose management and administration has been principally the work of army officers.

Our pioneering days in distant lands have perhaps ended. On the eve of a period of construction and progress which we hope will be one of the greatest our country has known, the army is, however, once more a pioneer. A very significant influence in standardization of manufacture has been exerted by the War Department in its planning for the mobilization of national industries in time of war. The tractor industry has come of military experiments in design of tanks and artillery tractors. The activities of our air service are preparing the way for an aviation industry, and keeping the art alive in the meantime. The aerial development of the army is not only real preparedness but it promises an extension to commercial life. The army has likewise pioneered in radio. It modifies commercial apparatus for military purposes, but its research and development are continually presenting solutions of difficult problems. Among these are the loop which to some extent superseded outside antennae, and led the way to the radio compass, besides the invention which applied radio principles to commercial telephones, and made possible broadcasting over telegraph, telephone and even power lines. The Army telephone system is second only to one on our continent.

The activities of the Army Chemical Warfare service promise one of the greatest opportunities for service. The deadly Mustard Gas is being hopefully tested for use in treatment of tuberculosis. The use of war gases in medical treatment of influenzas and similar diseases is very encouraging. This branch of the army has apparently solved the problem of safe and effective fumigation of ships, warehouses, and other insect and animal refuges. Tear gases have been demonstrated as effective in controlling criminals,

and in suppressing jail deliveries and riots. The gas mask has been tried out with success for mining, and the army has produced the only substance protecting miners against carbon-monoxide gas. The control of the boll weevil will come from the same source. The Chemical warfare service has led the way to foundation of an American dye industry that should one day be one of the great national assets.

The army has played an important part in the development of the steel industry. It was the original market for steel, and led the entire industry in the specifications for design. The army specifications for high grade steel have generally been fifty percent more severe than any others, thus promoting the production of superior quality. Alloy steels were introduced by the army ordnance department. For years the Watertown Arsenal was the leader in metallurgical study, preceding the creation of the Bureau of Standards, and it exerted a strong influence in stimulating the work of the technical schools. Scientific Management was largely born of army arsenal methods, and the first card system of shop returns was devised at Frankford.

The Federal Power Commission organized under the War Department is now studying the proposed development of water power in excess of twenty million horse-power, or more than twice the existing power development of our country, and more than the combined potential resources of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Arctic and Baltic drainages of Russia,—the principal water power region of Europe. The chief engineer of the Commission and his assistants, and the chief counsel are army officers. Within two years it has studied projects for development of resources under Federal control amounting to six times the aggregate of projects for the development of resources under Federal control in the preceding twenty years.

Army engineers lead in flood prevention and are assisting in forest protection. During the past year over one hundred thousand square miles of forest lands were constantly and effectively patrolled by army fliers and over fifty percent of the twelve hundred and forty-eight fires occurring

in the National Preserves of California in the critical three months of the danger season were reported by the aerial patrols.

The memory of the service of the army in the San Francisco earthquake in administering the forces of order is still gratefully cherished at the Golden Gate. In the Galveston disaster of 1915 it made a record of heroic achievement. Its constructive value was felt in the Mount Pelee cataclysm, and during every great Ohio and Mississippi flood, for many years.

The Chief Co-ordinator under the Director of the Budget is an Army officer, and is assisted by nine others. The army furnishes a Governor General to the Philippines, an Ambassador to Cuba, a Fuel Administrator to the great state of New York, a Director of the Budget, the active member of Alaskan Roads Commission, the Governor and the Chief Engineer of the Panama Canal and Zone, and the chief administrator of the railway of Alaska. The Assistant Secretary of War with his army assistant is performing one of the most complicated and extensive tasks that has ever confronted an industrial organizer, in the army plans for industrial mobilization in event of war.

The Act of June 1920, gave this country the first real military policy it has ever had, and made it permanent, subject only to the pleasure of Congress. The function of the regular army in this three-part Army of the United States, is its principal duty, and is the paramount opportunity of our times³ for real service to kin and country. The Military Policy itself is a conservative Insurance Policy against war and internal disturbances. In addition to assisting to train the National Guard and Organized Reserve the regular army constitutes the first line which in time of national danger would guard strategic points on our frontiers against invasion while behind such protection there would be formed the armies necessary to guarantee our national safety in the war to follow. It further constitutes at the present time the dependable land force available in case of internal disturbance, and against destructive radical forces which are steadily working to overthrow our governmental institutions and

loot the products of our industry. It is insurance of the participating kind. The training for national defense will always bring returns to the country in the physical and sanitary betterment of the young manhood of the nation. The draft statistics of the World War showed that about fifty percent of our young men have disabling defects most of which can be corrected by physical training and instruction. This is one of the most serious and interesting aspects of the army opportunity.

This is an age when many serious people are studying problems of race betterment. The World War gave the opportunity for a survey of the physical condition of the nation. The majority of our World War recruits were narrow-chested, awkward, and under weight in proportion to height. Many basic diseases and disabilities, such as weak arches, weak backs, malaria, social diseases, incipient tuberculosis and numerous other troubles were discovered in time and eradicated. Inoculations and prophylactic treatments resulted in new minimum records for prevalence. The occurrence of these diseases throughout the country has been much lessened as a result of the medical administration and training of young men during the war. Camps were made models of neatness, and personal sanitation and hygiene were taught as fundamentals. This experience will largely govern the administration and conduct of the summer training camps under the Act of June 4th 1920. Such achievements are the work not only of the medical officer but of his line brother. Yellow fever, malignant malaria, and tropical anaemia have largely disappeared from our neighbors to the south as the result of great constructive work by the army Medical Corps. It is a work in which line and staff pull together in the team. The influence of the summer camps is a continual education against intemperance in all its forms. There can be no higher usefulness than to share in this regenerative work. The common thought of the best statesmen in our hundred and fifty years of national life has been that a program for continued peace is best served by plans for defense. The army has always stood for peace. "I know of no war in which America has been engaged, offensive or

defensive, which was brought about by army pressure, or indeed, stimulated by military desire" (Secretary of War Baker).

The power that comes to the successful leader in civil life is very great. With such power comes the obligation for service. It is met in a very splendid way by many great chiefs of finance and industry, of whom all Americans are proud, and to whom humanity owes a great debt. But in civil life such opportunity comes to a man as the result of success, and when his years are few. In the army the opportunity is present all through life, and the improvement of such opportunity for service is itself the success one seeks, and it depends only upon the individual desire and ability. The accumulated experience which makes the officer of value to his country in a time of great emergency, is itself born of what he has made of his opportunity for service to others.

What does the army offer in the distinction which ambitious men seek; how shall one's name live after him; does the military brow ever wear the laurel? The regular army has furnished two Presidents of the United States and one to the Confederate States. Senators, cabinet ministers, members of the lower House, state officials, ambassadors and ministers, have been proud to point to a regular army record. The army has furnished forty-six presidents to universities and colleges, and a great many professors. It has graduated eighty-seven presidents of railroads and other great corporations. A Bishop of the Episcopal Church, a graduate of West Point gave his life as a lieutenant general in the Confederate Army. The military establishment has to its credit a great number of editors, clergymen, engineers, bankers, judges, consuls, artists and authors.

History will honor the names of a great many professional soldiers of the United States Army. The verdict of history is generally just. In our country, or any country with a tendency toward pure democracy, the professional soldier seldom finds favor with the politicians. It is well recognized that the regular officer and soldier being without the vote are generally without much serious representation among the statesmen of the Republic. The reaction which

seems inevitable in the United States after every war, has sometimes resulted in belittling the accomplishments of our successful soldiers during their lifetime. The full recognition of our great leaders of the Civil War was long delayed and in some cases never granted. Sheridan received a full generalcy only when the world knew that he was dying. Forty years after the Civil War was ended a succession of lieutenant generals were appointed who had held only insignificant rank in that great conflict, but Meade and Thomas went to their graves unrewarded. A certain grim philosophy prevails among officers of the army, and it is recognized that the best reward that can come to the American officer as he nears the end of his career is the approbation of those with whom he has served. If those who knew him best, who have shared with him the dangers of flood and field, the vicissitudes of peace and war, of prosperity and adversity, appraise him as a real man, when the riderless horse with the reversed boots is led slowly behind the flagdraped caisson, and the volleys and the trumpets sound in his honor for the last time, the servant of his country may well trust his fame to the verdict of history.

There is much about the Army that is naturally dear to one who has given his best years to it. The heart of any true soldier must tell him that his is one of the noblest professions. Prophecy for the future does not lie within the soldier's domain, yet he like others may read the future by the past. Looking backward he can find predecessors among those who in all ages have been great through service. At the waning of his days if he has kept the faith and held aloft his standards, Duty, Honor, Country, he who chooses the Army as a career will merit that tribute that the poet gives,—and which can be won by neither wealth nor wile;

*"His work is done
But while the races of mankind endure
Let his great example stand
Colossal, seen of every land,
And keep the soldier firm, the statesman pure"*
(Tennyson).

The American General Staff

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WITH the exception of Congress itself, toward which a cynical disrespect appears in all walks of American life that was unknown thirty years ago, there is perhaps no agency of our Government which has received more unfavorable comment in the press in the past few years than the General Staff of the Army. Especially has this been true during the months in which the air service has been seeking independence of the remainder of the military team. It has become the national goat. The American people, who pay for the institution, are entitled to know for what they pay and how it fulfills its purposes. Hence this article.

The General Staff, in its present form, is the creation of our most distinguished soldier, General Pershing, the only American general since Washington who has ever successfully commanded our armies through an entire war. Since his retirement, in 1924, the chief of staff has been Major Gen. John L. Hines, during the Great War one of the best corps commanders in our own or any other army. Every one of the five assistant chiefs of staff is a successful soldier who served in France. The great majority of the approximately 100 officers who constitute our War Department General Staff are graduates of the school of war. Every one is either a man of staff capacity proved on active service against the enemy, or is a product of our General Service Schools and Army War College, winning his place by fierce competition in courses of study directed by successful commanders in that great conflict.

I entered the Regular Army as a private of infantry in January, 1889, and received my commission as a lieutenant of cavalry in July, 1891. I had fourteen years of service before our Army had a General Staff, and have had more than twenty-two years in which to observe its workings since Congress created it in 1903. My opportunities for

knowledge of the General Staff of the Army and its workings—and of what the Army was before we had it—have been excellent. I was an eyewitness to much of its efficiency in France and am a beneficiary of that efficiency. I respect and admire the General Staff as an institution. Very much of whatever professional preferment came to me through the war was due to the splendid General Staff of our armies in France, of which I was proud to be a member, and under whose supporting counsels I was glad to serve in the field at a later period.

Feeling as I do, I conclude that the American people, whose opinions, crystallized through the press, may generally be relied upon when they are in possession of the facts, have lacked a dependable presentation of the history of the General Staff and its relations to the remainder of the Army. I may be thought to be a prejudiced witness, but as a retired officer I am beyond hope of reward or fear of displeasure.

The General Staff was a long time winning a place in our military organization, for as early as 1798 we find the first official reference to it by an officer of our Army. In that year George Washington was appointed lieutenant general of the Army of the United States, in anticipation of war with France. Successful commander in the War for Independence, he had completed two terms as commander in chief, by virtue of the presidency, and had sought the quiet retirement of Mount Vernon, when he was again called to the service of his country. Prompted by the memory of bitter experience, he at once set about making the preparation which has been lacking at the beginning of every war we have ever fought.

In letters written by General Washington to Secretary of War McHenry, himself a soldier of experience, we find the first President urging the formation of a General Staff. Thus on Independence Day, 1798:

“To remark to a military man how all-important the General Staff of an Army is to its well-being, and how essential, consequently, to the Commander in Chief, seems to be unnecessary; and yet a good choice is of such immense

consequence that I must be allowed to explain myself. . . . ought to be men of the most respectable character and of first-rate abilities, because, from the important nature of their respective offices and from their being always about the Commander in Chief, who is obliged to trust many things to them confidentially, scarcely any movement can take place without their knowledge. It follows then, that besides possessing the qualifications just mentioned, they ought to have those of integrity and prudence in an eminent degree, that entire confidence might be reposed in them."

The history of command in our Army for more than a century after Washington recommended a General Staff is an interesting one. During the Revolution the Army had been commanded by the Continental Congress, except for a few months in 1777, when Washington had the full control. For the remainder of the war the congressional command was exercised through a Board of War and a Secretary of War. After the Revolution, General Knox, Lieutenant Colonel Harmar, Generals St. Clair, Mad Anthony Wayne and Wilkinson were in turn the senior officer, though the command of our forces by both land and sea was exercised for about nine years by the Secretary of War.

All the arguments now urged for a separate department of national defense were current in 1798 as reasons against the creation of a Navy Department. Other than to take steps toward a proper organization in anticipation of war with France, Washington exercised no active command in the provisional army of 12,000 men authorized in 1798, but held the office of lieutenant general until he died in the following year, being succeeded by Alexander Hamilton as the senior officer of the Army. Hamilton was not assigned to the command of the Army, which went out of existence in 1800, when the war cloud disappeared.

From 1798 no officer was assigned to command the Army until the President so designated Major General Macomb by an order of May, 1828. After Macomb came Scott, who wore the title of commanding general of the Army from 1841 to 1861, though, during the Mexican War, commanding no part of the Army but that under him in

Mexico. He retired from age and infirmity in 1861 and was followed for a brief time by McClellan, who was absent from Washington in the field. Halleck was brought to the War Department in 1862, but really served as chief of staff to the aggressive and able but arbitrary and imperious Stanton. Halleck was followed by Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Schofield and Miles, who, as last of his line, retired in August, 1903. Theoretically, this long list of distinguished soldiers commanded the Army, but no one of them exercised command beyond administration and discipline.

Congress has never surrendered fiscal control of the United States Army to a military man, except in the rare instance when an army officer has been for the time acting as Secretary of War. Under the Constitution the President is commander in chief, and his representative at the head of the Army is the Secretary of War, through whom he communicates with it. There is no constitutional authority for the position of commanding general of the Army separate and distinct from the President. No statute ever prescribed duties for the place. The office of commanding a general was never recognized by Congress, except incidentally in appropriations for office furniture and similar items.

Yet Congress, in its desire specially to honor certain great soldiers, tacitly acknowledged such a place by the creation of the title of General of the Armies, conferred in turn on Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and Pershing. But the attempt to exercise command commensurate with the title inevitably led to friction.

When General Grant became President, Sherman was assigned to command the Army, and in his order assuming command announced the various permanent bureau chiefs of the War Department as members of his staff. The new Secretary of War was John A. Rawlins, who, as a volunteer officer, had been chief of staff for Grant during the last years of the Civil War. General Sherman's exercise of full command was terminated in a few weeks and he was directed to revoke the order regarding the bureau chiefs.

In disgust, he forsook Washington, taking his titular

headquarters of the Army to his home city of St. Louis, where it remained for many years.

Grant was as reluctant to permit his old friend Sherman really to command as any civilian who ever sat in the presidential chair. Before Pershing, practically every general of the Armies was the center of controversy in attempting to exercise command. The same was true of every senior major general assigned by order to command the Army, except Schofield and Halleck, each of whom really acted as chief of staff for the Secretary of War, subordinating his own individuality. No compromise was ever devised to meet the situation. By law the fiscal control of the Army has remained with the Secretary of War, and no general can exercise command over any expenditures except by the Secretary's delegated authority. The one who controls the purse strings really commands the Army, no matter what his title. Controversy raged throughout the century and involved many names honored in our history.

Meantime independent staff and supply bureaus existed, and others were created by law to assist the Secretary of War, but usually only on the civil or fiscal aspect of his functions. These bureaus acknowledged no common military superior and were without coordination as part of the military team except as such impulse might come from the civilian Secretary of War, who was without any disinterested military advisers. With no professional fitness for it, and overwhelmed by the mass of detail involved in the fiscal control of the War Department, the secretary could give little time to military coordination. The permanent bureaus, however efficient, enjoyed practical independence.

Occasionally throughout our first century the serenity of bureau life was interrupted by actual or threatened war, but the emergency over, it ran smoothly back into the accustomed channels. The rival ambitions of bureau chiefs, the temporary favor enjoyed by any one of them to the corresponding discomfiture of the others, bred a race of military courtiers around the office of the Secretary of War. Meantime a permanent tenure afforded sufficient leisure for acquiring merit in the eyes of Congress, with aggrandize-

ment of particular corps. The commanding general, barred from this happy bureaucratic family, devised new uniforms for himself, was photographed occasionally, took hunting trips incidental to inspections, busied himself with military administration not involving expenditures and exchanged scowls with the independent and arrogant staff departments.

The War Department knew no clear distinction between policy and routine work. There was no thinking department for the institution; none that was specifically charged with considering questions of major importance or with the duty of foresight or initiative. No one did any general planning involving the use of the military machine as a whole. Certain service schools, quite elementary from the standpoint of imparting the art of command in war, languished without special attention. These schools were in no way dovetailed into relationship in any general scheme of military training. It was the particular business of no one.

The attempt to centralize a vast number of incongruous functions in the personality of the occasional strong Secretary of War resulted in only temporarily restraining staff bureaus, greedy for power and on easy terms with a patronage-loving Congress. Staff and supply officers, being permanently commissioned in their corps, were out of touch with the remainder of the service, and in the higher grades, stationed at the capital, were strangers to the line of the Army and its needs.

The Army was run after the manner of a correspondence school. The ancient grind about the Army being a fine place if it were not for the soldiers well describes the staff attitude in the happy, careless 90's before the Spanish-American War. No one was charged with preparing the team for teamwork. The long period of peace after the Civil War brought a sleepy oblivion to the requirements of war. The soldier was in eclipse and the staff bureaus were in uncoordinated ascendancy. All real authority was divided among them.

The outbreak of the Spanish-American War found the office of commanding general occupied by General Miles, then in late middle life, but restless under the impotence of his authority and keenly regretful of his earlier days as a

fighting commander, for Miles had been a major general in the Civil War at an age when men now aspire to be lieutenants. He had not witnessed with complacency the constant aggrandizement of the permanent bureaus, and his resentment had reacted on him in the form of friction with the new Secretary of War, himself a Civil War veteran.

The command of the Santiago expedition was given to General Shafter, who, like Secretary Alger, was a native of Michigan. With all his title of commanding general, Miles exercised no control over Shafter's corps, but was eventually allowed to conduct an expedition to Porto Rico. Meanwhile, with even the office room of a commanding general vacant in the War, State and Navy Building, the talented administrator at the head of the adjutant general's office took charge of the Secretary from Michigan and of the war, and for that eventful summer of 1898 carried the War Department around in a portfolio under his arm. General Corbin was in many respects a great man, and he saw duties that had to be done and opportunities that went with them. He neglected neither duty nor opportunity. There was no one to do the duties which should have devolved on a General Staff, and General Corbin assumed them as far as an individual could.

The system of centralization in the War Department had existed so many years that now, confronted with war, the department was still obliged to attempt to run everything from Washington. Our people had forgotten that, after all, armies must win their battles under the command of generals. Any system that deprives these officers of authority up to the moment of battle is iniquitous and dangerous. The organization, equipment and mobilization of the volunteers called for were thus centralized in the offices of Secretary Alger and Adjutant General Corbin.

Their office rooms, as well as the corridors of the War Department, were jammed with aspirants for appointments and with members of Congress pressing the claims of constituents. Most of their business, impossible of transaction under the circumstances, had to be handled at night, to avoid the pressure. Omnipresent in the crowds were enterprising newspaper men, who listened to confidential as well

as routine business. Almost all orders appeared in the press of the country before being received by those to whom addressed. If we had been opposed by a first-class military power, years of reverse and disaster would have been inevitable.

Those who endured those days of doubt will readily recall the embalmed-beef scandals, the typhoid-infected camps of the South, the wild confusion that everywhere prevailed, the actual terror that reigned along our Atlantic Coast until Cervera's fleet was located, and the prolonged investigations which followed our summer of crass inefficiency, and practically drove Secretary Alger from office in the summer of 1899.

That this situation was due to occur had been evident to military students for many years. In the early '70s Col. Emory Upton, one of the most distinguished of our young major generals during the Civil War, with two other selected officers, had been sent abroad to study the armies of Europe and Asia. General Sheridan had been an observer on the German side during the Franco-Prussian War. Generals Sherman and Schofield and others had been students of foreign military systems, and had left written record of their studies. The public opinion of our best line officers had been crystallizing toward the creation of a General Staff. Confronted with conditions as they evolved in the war with Spain, every thoughtful officer who had considered the subject realized that revision of our military system was an urgent necessity.

Inheriting the situation left by Secretary Alger, as well as the suppression of the Philippine Insurrection, the organization of the government of the new dependencies taken over from Spain, and the task of financial retrenchment following the war, there came to the War Department one of the greatest men our country has produced, Elihu Root, of New York. Without advisers, except as he found them among the bureau chiefs, each independent in his own sphere, his splendid mind at once recognized the necessity of radical change. He found the greatest business in the country in dire confusion and without a board of directors. He was at

once aware of the antagonisms between the bureau chiefs of the War Department and the line of the Army as represented by the commanding general.

Secretary Root's attention was very early directed to the report by Gen. Emory Upton on the armies of Europe and Asia, and to his unpublished work on military policy, which was finally located in the possession of Colonel Henry A. Dupont of Delaware. Mr. Root caused its publication, and it has been for a quarter of a century the work of highest authority on our military policy.

There was still a considerable fraction of Congress which has seen service on one side or the other in the Civil War. In every reform of military policy in our country there is encountered the complacent attitude of those in high places who have participated in success under the system to be superseded, no matter what its defects.

Previous to 1917, no American doubted that our Civil War was greater than any other, though it was really so badly managed that a committee of Congress sat through it continuously, investigating the conduct of the war.

Some opposition to a General Staff, of which the best existing model at that time was German, was certain to be met. Nor was there any enthusiasm for it among those separate entities of the War Department who would be compelled to surrender power to it.

Convinced in his own mind as early as February, 1900, Secretary Root proceeded to set the stage for a General Staff, and administratively paved the way for it by creating an Army War College with certain general-staff powers. He convened a board of officers to formulate the project and draw regulations for its future conduct and guidance. This board, whose names deserve recording, was composed of Brigadier Gen. William Ludlow, Col. Henry C. Hasbrouck and Lieutenant Col. William H. Carter; later Lieutenant Col. Joseph P. Sanger was added. All were officers of the highest type. Colonel Carter was the close adviser of Secretary Root throughout the whole inception and organization of the General Staff, and to him, more than to any other

one officer, the United States is indebted for its adoption. It is the monument to his lifelong service for his country.

The Ludlow board submitted its report in October, 1900, which urged legislative provision for a General Staff at the earliest possible time. Meantime there was evident need for such a staff to supervise the instruction of the large increment of young volunteer officers who joined after the reorganization of February, 1901. The bill for the creation of a General Staff was laid before Congress on February 14, 1902. It was pending for a year, and during two sessions, becoming a law February 14, 1903.

The Senate Military Affairs Committee, which considered the bill, had on it two former Secretaries of War, and every senator on the committee had served either in the Union or Confederate Armies during the Civil War. There were many veterans of that conflict in both Houses of Congress twenty-three years ago.

The bill met with opposition from various agencies which saw their ancient powers threatened. Some feared friction in the War Department with a secretary, a commanding general of the Army and a chief of staff. Others believed the old controversies would be increased instead of diminished. Many questions were asked; many phantoms argued to dissolution. The most convincing witness was Secretary Root himself, then in the very height of his splendid powers. After praising the competence of the staff and supply bureaus, he said:

"When we come to the coordination and direction of all these agencies and means of warfare, so that all parts of the machine shall work together, we are weak. Our system makes no adequate provision for the directing brain which every army must have to work successfully. . . . The most intelligible way to describe such a body of men, however selected and organized, is by calling it a general staff, because its duties are staff duties and are general in their character."

The illustration used by Secretary Root is a very complete statement of the planning functions of a General Staff:

“It is easy for the President, or a general acting under his direction, to order that 50,000 or 100,000 men proceed to Cuba and capture Havana. To make an order which has any reasonable chance of being executed he must do a great deal more than that. He must determine how many men shall be sent and how they shall be divided among the different arms of the service, and how they shall be armed and equipped; and to do that he must get all the information possible about the defenses of the place to be captured and the strength and character and armament of the forces to be met. He must determine at what points and by what routes the place shall be approached, and at what point his troops shall land in Cuba; and for this purpose he must be informed about the various harbors of the island and the depths of their channels, what classes of vessels can enter them, what the facilities for landing are, how they are defended, the character of the roads leading from them to the place to be attacked, the character of the intervening country, how far it is healthful or unhealthful, what the climate is liable to be at the season of the proposed movement, the temper and sympathies of the inhabitants, the quantity and kinds of supplies that can be obtained from the country, the extent to which transportation can be obtained, and a great variety of other things which will go to determine whether it is better to make the approach from one point or another, and to determine what it will be necessary for the army to carry with it in order to succeed in moving and living and fighting.

“All this information it is the business of a General Staff to procure and present. It is probable that there would be in such case a number of alternative plans, each having certain advantages and disadvantages, and these should be worked out each by itself, with the reasons for and against it, and presented to the President or general for his determination. This the General Staff should do. This cannot be done in an hour. It requires that the staff shall have been at work a long time, collecting the information and arranging it and getting it in form to present. Then, at home, where the preparation for the expedition is to be made, the

order must be based upon a knowledge of the men and material available for its execution, how many men there are who can be devoted to that purpose, from what points they are to be drawn, what bodies of troops ought to be left or sent elsewhere, and what bodies may be included in the expedition; whether there are ships to transport them, where they are to be obtained, whether they are properly fitted up, what more should be done to them; what are the available stocks of clothing, arms and ammunition, engineers' material and horses and wagons, and all the innumerable supplies and munitions necessary for a large expedition; how are the things to be supplied which are not ready but which are necessary, and how long will be required to supply them.

"All this and much more necessary information it is the business of a General Staff to supply. When that has been done the order is made with all available knowledge of all the circumstances upon which the movement depends for its success. It is then the business of a General Staff to see that every separate officer upon whose action the success of the movement depends understands his share in it and does not lag behind in the performance of that share; to see that troops and ships and animals and supplies of arms and ammunition and clothing and food, and so on, from hundreds of sources come together at the right time and places. It is a laborious, complicated and difficult work which requires a considerable number of men whose special business it is and who are charged with no other duties.

"It was the lack of such a body of men doing that kind of work which led to the confusion attending the Santiago expedition in the summer of 1898. The confusion at Tampa and elsewhere was the necessary result of having a large number of men, each of them doing his own special work the best he could, but without any adequate force of officers seeing that they pulled together according to detailed plans made beforehand. Such a body of men doing general-staff duty is just as necessary to prepare an army properly for war in time of peace as it is in time of war. It is not an executive body; it is not an administrative body; it acts only through the authority of others. It makes intelligent

command possible by procuring and arranging information and working out plans in detail, and it makes intelligent and effective execution of commands possible by keeping all the separate agents advised of the parts they are to play in the general scheme."

The bill went to its passage a month later. The act abolished the office of commanding general of the Army, provided for a military chief of staff to the President, who, acting under the direction of the President or of the Secretary of War, representing him, should have supervision not only over all troops of the line but of the special staff and supply departments, which had theretofore reported directly to the Secretary of War; and it created for the assistance of the chief of staff a corps of forty-four officers, who were relieved of all other duties. The function of this new corps was described by the statute as follows:

"Section 2. That the duties of the General Staff Corps shall be to prepare plans for the national defense and for the mobilization of the military forces in time of war; to investigate and report upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the army and its state of preparation for military operations; to render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and to General Officers and other superior commanders, and to act as their agents in informing and coordinating the action of all the different Officers who are subject, under the terms of this Act, to the supervision of the Chief of Staff; and to perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be from time to time prescribed by the President."

In the regulations drawn up by Secretary Root to carry this legislation into effect, he emphasized the "relation of absolute confidence and personal accord and sympathy between the Chief of Staff and the President, and necessarily also between the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War," and provided that the chief of staff should automatically go out of office with the President who appointed him. This requirement is still in force, and the resignation of his place is incumbent upon any chief of staff whose relations to his superiors cease to be those of personal accord and sympathy. The super-

visory power vested in the chief of staff was defined as covering duties pertaining to the command, discipline, training and recruitment of the Army, military operations, distribution of troops, inspections, armament, fortifications, military education and instruction, and kindred matters, including also, in an advisory capacity, such duties connected with fiscal administration and supply as were committed to him by the Secretary of War.

The General Staff was made a detailed corps. Upon being relieved from duty in it, officers return to the branch of the Army in which commissioned, and no officer is eligible to redetail until he has served two years with his own branch of the service, except during actual or threatened war. Thus the General Staff Corps in a constantly changing detail of officers from the actual troops, with the purpose of having it represent the opinion of the Army upon technical military subjects, as that opinion is matured and developed by actual experience. The General Staff is divided between that in the War Department and that with troops.

The first selections for the General Staff were made by an excellent board of high rank, sworn to recommend officers upon their merits as shown by their records. Indicating the character of that initial detail in 1903, a single office room of the new corps that year was occupied by Major Goethals, Captains Pershing, March and Dickman—all names forever linked with our success in the World War.

Any agency which exists to bring about unity of control, whether in civil or military life, incurs the criticism of the various entities which must surrender power and patronage if unity of control is to be had. The institution of the new coordinating corps was attended with some friction.

There was some duplication of effort and a tendency to absorb administrative functions. Being a constantly changing body, it was at some disadvantage compared to staff corps with continuity of personnel. New to its responsibilities and surroundings, it went so far in tact and diplomacy in its effort to avoid friction that its self-respect suffered, with some diminution of its legitimate influence.

Speaking only by the authority of the Secretary of War,

the rank of the chief of staff as compared to the bureau chiefs was immaterial. But the prestige of rank is very strong in our Army, and when a chief of staff took office who found himself junior to a powerful and aggressive adjutant general, it was not long until efficiency suffered.

Then in 1916 the National Defense Act was passed. This act bore evidence that certain influential members of Congress believed that the General Staff had diverted itself from its proper duties, while it invaded and interfered with the jurisdiction of the several permanent bureaus of the War Department. The new law emphasized the distinction "administrative duties," and prohibited members of the General Staff from performing duties of that nature.

Such had been the intent of the law which created the General Staff, and that had been the understanding of the Army. Secretary Root's statement in 1902, "It is not an administrative body," was accepted as a part of the basic General Staff doctrine. There was before Congress at this time no catalogue of evils calling for remedy. No complaints of encroachments by the General Staff or of neglect of its proper duties had been made by the Secretary of War, who alone could speak with authority for the War Department. Doubtless individual officers had expressed adverse opinions to members of Congress.

That summer of 1916, however, was to witness a crisis in the history of the General Staff. The judge advocate-general of the Army, Brigadier General Enoch H. Crowder, one of the ablest lawyers who has ever filled that place, and who a year later was to play one of the greatest parts on the stage of the World War by his administration of the Draft Act, rendered an opinion in construction of the new law which if adopted by the Secretary of War would have emasculated the chief of staff of all workable authority and would have sent our country into the World War with much the same lack of coordination we suffered in 1898.

The Secretary of War would have been bound to rely upon the uncoordinated advice of individual bureau chiefs, and though purporting to leave the chief of staff the duty of coordinating the functions of those bureaus, it would have

prohibited that degree of supervision which was necessary to equip him with qualifying information. It would have inaugurated a race for power among the bureau chiefs and erected their departments into a system of coordinating impediments to one another.

Fortunately for the country, a great lawyer, Newton D. Baker, one of the ablest men who has ever occupied the position, was Secretary of War. Few single acts of his great career as a War Secretary meant more for our country than his complete disapproval of the destructive opinion rendered him, and his lucid interpretation of the law, preserving to him his military advisers in the conflict which was soon to demand the supreme efforts of the greatest military establishment that America has ever known. Secretary Baker thus sums up:

"The policy of the War Department, therefore, will remain as heretofore: The Chief of Staff, speaking in the name of the Secretary of War, will coordinate and supervise the various bureaus, offices and departments of the War Department; he will advise the Secretary of War; he will inform himself in as great detail as in his judgment seems necessary to qualify him adequately to advise the Secretary of War. Should any regulations or orders be necessary to place the determination herein made in proper form, the chief of the General Staff will prepare them for my signature."

From its organization until the World War the General Staff had been confronted with no war emergency. The intervention in Cuba in 1906 was planned by it, and the chief of staff went to Cuba in command for a period. Pershing's punitive expedition into Mexico after the Villa raid in March, 1916, was unaccompanied by members of the General Staff, though he had a chief of staff and certain other officers performing such functions. The War Department absorbed the best men and the greatest number of the General Staff, and its representation with troops was relatively small and unimportant.

In Washington it was divided between the Army War College and the War Department. Under the strong pacifist leanings of President Wilson, which had lost him his first

Secretary of War, there was little real preparation for the war by anyone.

When the United States declared war, the planning members of the General Staff working at the War College were handed a few questions for study, practically none of which bore relation to the war as we later fought our part in it. The chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott, was detached by the President in May, 1917, and sent to Russia with the Root Mission, and did not return until late summer, when on the eve of his retirement for age.

General Pershing was designated for the command in France about two weeks before he sailed on May 28, 1917. He was permitted to select two of the General Staff officers on duty in Washington, to whom was added a third officer intended for General Staff duty. Perhaps no one grasped the magnitude of General Pershing's undertaking. It was something to which we all had to grow, and the authorities in the War Department naturally grew more slowly than those of us confronted with the actual problem of organization in France. It was at once evident that the peacetime organization of our General Staff must give way to one based on the actual war experience of our Allies. Under our Field Service Regulations the General Staff had a combat and an intelligence branch. The studies of our military men, when they contemplated war with a European power, had always assumed it as taking place on American soil, with our armies disposed in defensive warfare, with line of communication leading back to the sources of supply in our own country.

This war, on the contrary, was to be fought across 3000 miles of ocean, involving passage through a submarine menace, landing in the congested ports of an ally already at war, forwarding troops and supplies an average distance of 500 miles from the seaboard and engaging in war of a kind and scale contemplated by no peacetime plans that existed.

In the light of war as our Allies knew it by 1917, the landing of General Pershing with but three General Staff officers must have been pathetic and very discouraging. It is not surprising that they dwelt on the difficulty of creating a

trained staff and urged that our participation in the war be by supplying men and junior officers to their depleted battalions.

General Pershing, on arrival in France, sent selected officers to study the staff organizations of the British and French. An American mission which had been observing the war on the Western Front came at once under his command. Its members, particularly Majors James A. Logan, Frank Parker and Marlborough Churchill, had observed to advantage, and were of much use in developing plans for our Staff. The Commander in Chief and his chief of staff visited both the French and British General Headquarters and studied their staff organization. It was realized that our situation differed from that of our Allies.

The French Army was at home and in touch with its civil government and War Ministry. The British were organized on an oversea basis, but were within easy reach of their base of supplies in England. Their problems of supply and replacement were simple. Their training could be carried out at home, with the experience of the Front at hand, while our men must come as ships were available and their training be resumed where it had been discontinued in America. Our available tonnage was inadequate to meet initial demands, so that priority of material for combat and construction, as well as for supplies not obtainable in Europe, must be established by those whose perspective included all the services and who were familiar with general plans. For the proper direction and coordination of the details of administration, intelligence, operations, supply and training, a General Staff was absolutely indispensable.

After much consideration General Pershing made a tentative assignment of General Staff duties and created the appropriate agencies to handle them. This arrangement continued until March, 1918, when a board of officers was convened to study the system and recommend proper action. Under their advice General Pershing then allotted General Staff functions at his headquarters to five sections:

To the first, or administrative section, ocean tonnage, priority of oversea shipments, replacement of men and ani-

mals, organization and types of equipment for troops, billeting, prisoners of war, military police, leaves and leave areas, welfare work and amusement.

To the second, or intelligence section, information regarding the enemy, including espionage and counter espionage, maps and censorship.

To the third, or operations section, strategic studies and plans, and employment of combat troops.

To the fourth, or supply section, coordination of supply services, including construction, transportation, and medical departments, and control of regulating stations for supply.

To the fifth, or training section, tactical training, schools, preparation of tactical manuals and athletics.

This system was applied in the lower echelons of the command to include divisions, except that in corps and divisions the fourth section was merged with the first, and the fifth section with the third.

In the spring of 1918 matters of procurement, transportation and supply, and the chiefs of the several supply services, which had been centralized at Chaumont, were placed at Tours, directly under the commanding general, Services of Supply. General Headquarters thereafter concerned itself only with the broader phases of control. Under the supervision of the commander in chief, and pursuant to clearly determined policies, the assistant chiefs of staff—heads of sections—coordinated by the chief of staff, issued instructions and gave general direction to the great combat units and to services of supply, keeping always in touch with the manner and promptness of their fulfillment. This system of direct responsibility contemplated secrecy in preparation, prompt decision in emergency and coordinate action in execution.

To supply this staff the number of trained officers was inadequate. To meet the deficiency a General Staff College was organized at Langres in November, 1917. Student officers were carefully chosen for their suitability, and the short course of study was most intensive. This college graduated

537 officers, generally well equipped for staff duty, and imbued with the spirit of common service and teamwork. General Pershing is terse and direct, not given to volubility. His final report of the American Expeditionary Forces thus disposes of his General Staff:

“The duties of the General Staff, as well as those of the army and corps staffs, have been very ably performed. Especially is this true when we consider the new and difficult problems with which they have been confronted. This body of officers, both as individuals and as an organization, have, I believe, no superiors in professional ability, in efficiency or loyalty.”

Meanwhile a new General Staff had been created in the War Department. In the summer of 1917 many valuable members of the existing War Department General Staff had been permitted to abandon their work and to accept commissions in the new National Army, leaving the War Department without them at the time they were most needed. It fell to General March, who became chief of staff in May, 1918, to recreate a General Staff for the War Department. Its purpose was, of course, to serve the American Expeditionary Forces. Organized at home and composed in part of officers who had not served on the Western Front, its development naturally took a somewhat different direction from the one organized by General Pershing abroad.

After the war ended and the part played by the General Staff in General Pershing's great accomplishment gradually became known, a sentiment began to crystallize in favor of organizing the War Department along the lines of the staff that had acquitted itself so well in France. The new National Defense Act, approved June 4, 1920, increased the numbers of the War Department General Staff to five general officers and eighty-eight other officers of grades not below that of captain. The General Staff with troops was increased to such number as might be necessary to perform that class of duties at the several headquarters. The law provided that no officer should be detailed to the General Staff unless his name were on the eligible list. The initial eligible list was to be prepared by a board consisting of General Pershing, the

commandants respectively of the Army War College and the General Service Schools, and two other general officers to be selected by the Secretary of War who were not then members of the General Staff. This board selected and reported the names of all officers of the Regular Army, National Guard and Officers' Reserve Corps, of the following classes, believed by it to be qualified by education, experience and character for General Staff duty:

(a). Those officers graduated from the Army Staff College or the Army War College prior to July 1, 1917, who upon graduation were specifically recommended for duty as commander or chief of staff of a division or higher tactical unit, or for detail in the General Staff Corps;

(b). Those officers who, since April 6, 1917, have commanded a division or higher tactical unit, or have demonstrated by actual service in the World War that they are qualified for General Staff duty.

The initial General Staff list comprised 586 officers, of whom 305 were regulars and 281 were National Guard, Reserve Corps and former officers. The name of no officer has been added to this list unless, upon graduation from the General Service Schools, he has been specifically recommended as qualified for General Staff duty.

This provision is still the law. Officers thus selected represent the highest type that can be produced by our General Service Schools and War College, or that survived the experience of the World War. With this provision made as to the sources from which the General Staff shall be drawn, General Pershing was appointed chief of staff of the Army on July 1, 1921. Secretary of War Weeks gave him the specific task of organizing in the War Department a General Staff that should embody the results of our war experience, and provide against future emergencies a staff which could function well in both peace and war. The Secretary emphasized his desire that such a War Department staff should contain a nucleus for the general headquarters in the field in the event of mobilization.

General Pershing proceeded by convening a board of officers consisting of Major Generals James G. Harbord and

William G. Haan, Brigadier Generals Henry Jervcy and Fox Conner, and Colonels John McA. Palmer, Robert C. Davis and John L. DeWitt, to study and report upon the War Department General Staff, recommending such an organization as would meet the requirements laid down by Secretary Weeks. Of these officers the first named had served as chief of staff of the American Expeditionary Forces and later as a brigade and division commander, and was now assistant chief of staff; General Haan had been a division commander in France and was now an assistant chief of staff; General Jervcy served during the war as an assistant chief of staff in the War Department and was still on that duty; General Conner had been assistant chief of staff of the American Expeditionary Forces; Colonel Palmer had served as a General Staff officer in France and later as adviser to the Senate Military Committee when the National Defense Act was drawn. Colonel Davis had been the adjutant general of the American Expeditionary Forces and Colonel DeWitt a member of the General Staff at G. H. Q. and with troops.

This board, in addition to general consideration of the subject, endeavored to work out the relations that should exist between the personnel of the bureau of the adjutant general and the General Staff, and of the chiefs of combatant arms dealing with the same subject; the relation that should exist between the General Staff and the office of the Assistant Secretary of War in its duty of procurement of supplies; such a regrouping of the duties of the several divisions of the General Staff as would insure supervision of all staff activities of the War Department and eliminate overlapping of jurisdiction and duplication of effort; the advisability of changing the titles of the several divisions to conform to those used in the American Expeditionary Forces, and of authorizing shorter designations, familiar to many thousands of officers who had served abroad during the war; and such physical regrouping of the several offices of the General Staff in a systematic and convenient way as would facilitate business and lead to the reduction of commissioned and other personnel.

A NEW AMERICAN STAFF

This board approached its task by study of the laws creating the General Staff, and endeavored to adjust to its requirements the experience gained during the war. Before it made its report, repeated sessions were held with the several permanent staff and supply-bureau chiefs, discussing the proposed organization as it would affect them. Each admitted that the proposed relationships were workable as far as his department was concerned.

The present organization of the War Department is the one recommended by this board. In time it will become the American Staff, for the principles enunciated are to apply to all headquarters from the War Department down to a battalion. Under it the General Staff establishes policies and principles governing action on matters relating to the service, and studies important subjects and projects, especially those relating to defense and war plans. The branch concerned operates under these policies and principles announced on such broad lines that most cases can be disposed of without further consideration by the General Staff, and only special cases are referred to the chief of staff or the Secretary of War for personal action.

The divisions of the War Department General Staff are: First, or personnel; Second, or intelligence; Third, or operations and training; Fourth, or supply; Fifth, war plans. For the first four divisions there are used the old A.E.F. abbreviations, known to so many thousands of our great Army in France—G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, and for the War Plans, WPD.

G-1 is charged in general with those duties which relate to the personnel of the Army as individuals, such as procurement, assignments, promotions, retirement, transfer and discharge, replacements, regulations, uniforms, decorations, morale work, Red Cross and similar agencies, enemy aliens, prisoners of war, and so on.

G-2 is charged in general with collection, evaluation and dissemination of military information, and specifically with military topography maps, custody of General Staff maps, military attaches and observers, liaison with other intelligence

agencies, codes and ciphers, translations, press relations and censorship during war.

G-3 is charged in general with organization, training and operation of the military forces, and specifically with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning organization, assignment of units to higher organizations, distribution and training and location of units, drill and service regulations, special-service schools, military training in civilian institutions and training camps, priorities in assigning replacements and equipment and effecting mobilization, movements of troops and military police.

G-4 is charged with those General Staff duties relating to supply, and specifically with the preparation of basic supply plans on which the several supply branches may prepare their own plans in detail. It is also charged with preparation of plans and policies for and supervises distribution of storage and issue of supplies, transportation by land and water, including ports for embarkation and their auxiliaries, traffic control, tables of equipment, inventions, leasing of War Department facilities and revocable licenses, hospitalization of men and animals, distribution and movement of supply troops, property responsibility and accountability. This division also has the determination and statement of plans and policies governing the preparation of estimates for funds for military purposes and priorities relating thereto, as well as the procurement of real estate in connection with various purposes.

WPD has to do with the formulation of plans for the use in war of the military forces, separately or in conjunction with the naval forces, in the national defense. Its specific duties are those which relate to the general preparation of plans and policies for war, the instruction in service schools, estimates of forces needed, initial plans for their employment, actual operations in the theater of war. This division is so organized as to enable it in the event of mobilization to furnish a nucleus of the General Staff personnel for each of the divisions required at the general headquarters in the field.

On the report of this board, General Pershing directed the adjutant general as follows:

"Please file the following statement with the original proceedings of the Board on Reorganization of the War Department, of which Major General J. G. Harbord was president, and Colonel John L. DeWitt was recorder, viz:

"All papers submitted by this board, including the proposed General Orders No. 41, War Department, August 16, 1921, were carefully gone over by me. I am in entire accord with them and the proposed order and submitted them without change for the approval of the Secretary of War. They accurately represent my judgment as to the proper organization of the War Department, based upon my experience as commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in the World War. They crystallize our war experience. I recommend that there be no departure from the principles therein enunciated without the most serious deliberation and consideration."

Under this reorganization, without substantial change, the General Staff of the War Department operates today. Its success would hardly have been possible without the cooperation of the permanent bureaus, the chiefs of which are all officers of notable record during the World War. They are in many respects the best group of War Department bureau chiefs that has ever served our country. The adjutant general, Robert C. Davis, perhaps the most efficient officer who has ever held that place of power, never himself a member of the General Staff though on its eligible list, has, from strong conviction of its necessity and its correct organization, done as much as any individual to make its functioning a success.

There is no other corps of the Army so well guarded as to character and attainments as the General Staff. Detailed from every branch of the Army, its members reflect the composite voice of the service, the best American military opinion of the time. Constantly returning to the units from which they came, they carry back to the troops in distant stations and dependencies the latest interpretations of the national-

defense policy. Discussed and tried out in stations remote from the capital, these receive the corrective of Army public opinion through officers who, in turn, newly join the General Staff from the line.

Military doctrine is in, from and of the line of the Army—the fighting men. Safe-guarded by its method of appointment, the General Staff is neither ossified by permanence nor hidebound through isolation and lack of touch. Its strength is also its weakness, in its relations with Congress and the press. The lack of continuity of personnel makes it impersonal as far as those relations are concerned.

The General Staff man surrenders his individuality and merges it into the composite corps which studies and recommends policies. Nor is such a corps capable of organization against individuals or arms. Its greatest interest is to identify and secure the latest and best for war; its greatest problem is to find the right men—as is the case in every other trade or profession. Its life depends upon the efficiency of its work, the accuracy of its information and the soundness of its conclusions. But as long as there is resistance to authority in educational institutions and in business, there will be complaints against a General Staff or any other agency that exercises control.

The General Staff eligible list, as constituted today, contains the very elite of the officers who led our armies in France, and those who by severe scholastic test have since earned association with them on that list. They are worthy of the confidence of every patriotic American.

While he is yet spared to us, our country can have no safer, wiser military counselor than John J. Pershing, our great commander in chief on the Western Front. I commend to my countrymen these words from the final report he made in September, 1924, when by operation of law he passed from the active to the retired list:

“Not since the creation of the General Staff has there been more helpful cooperation and mutually cordial understanding than now exist between the General Staff and the various branches of the War Department. I believe the

present General Staff organization, its methods and its relation to the War Department are as contemplated in the organic law creating the General Staff, and as this development is largely based on our World War experience, I sincerely hope that in all essential particulars it will remain unchanged."

A Month in Belleau Woods in 1918

Address before the Detroit Bond Club February 22, 1928.

WHILE there should never come a time when Americans will be unwilling to listen to the story of their country's effort in the Great War, it is undeniable that our public has to a great extent lost interest in those stirring days. For those of us who bore some modest part in those events this indifference brings some regret, possibly some little bitterness, but it is not difficult to understand in this particular period of our history.

The four millions of Americans who wore the uniform ten years ago,—much less the two millions who crossed the sea, were in such a minority as compared to the total of our population that in the average American audience today one cannot expect that more than about one person in every sixty has had actual war experience, or is interested in such experiences from the standpoint of one who saw and was. There were about fifty thousand American soldiers killed in action or died of wounds, such a small number that it is probably exceeded each year by those who are killed in accidents. Were it possible to call back tonight the gallant Frenchmen who were killed or died of wounds, muster them in ghostly formation, and pass them in review beneath the windows of this building at the rate of ten thousand per hour, starting the melancholy march at this moment, and permitting no halt until all had passed, the column would be swinging by until midnight next Tuesday night. Starting at the same rate the American battle dead would pass before two o'clock tomorrow morning. That undoubtedly states the ration of interest in the War in this country today as compared with that which still throbs in France.

Again, there is an active Pacifist party in our country. There are many honest devoted Americans who believe it possible in the complex life of the 20th Century to accom-

plish that in which the Prince of Peace failed two thousand years ago. With them are allied the boys whose mothers brought them up to be slackers, many salaried up-lifters, and the radicals who, hating all government, hate also that which defends it. Here, too, will be found those unhappy creatures who, evading their duty in the Great War, seek to salve a guilty conscience and to create alibis to give their grandchildren, by establishing a record against war as a substitute for a record that might have been made in it. All of these people are interested in minimizing the extent of America's effort in the Great War, and in silencing the story that in a perhaps ruder but manlier age would have been the theme of generations.

My excuse, if one is needed for attempting to interest you tonight in a single short month of that War, must be this is the birthday of the successful soldier of the Revolution, which makes it not inappropriate, perhaps, and that I do not believe that bond men are of the kind that shirk their duty in peace or war. My judgment of you is that if your country needed you tomorrow her call would not be in vain. Of the bond men who were of suitable age ten years ago I doubt not that as great a proportion were found beneath the colors as was furnished by members of any other profession outside the regular Army and Navy.

Ten years ago this month your countrymen were represented in France by five divisions, furnishing with the non-combatant services a total of about 287,000 men. They were the 1st and 2nd Divisions of regulars, the 42nd or Rainbow Division hailing from all parts of the country, the 26th Division from New England, and the gallant 32nd Division coming from Michigan and Wisconsin.

The German submarine campaign appeared to have failed. The German High Command knew that American troops could be landed and supplied in France. It was felt by them, however, that the Americans would come slowly, and that for six months more the Allies would fight without them. German diplomacy and German sword had brought peace in the East after the fall of Russia. The same sword must do the work in the West, so that America's armies

when they arrived would find no Allies with whom to line up. Clearly, America would not fight Germany alone across three thousand miles of sea. Such was the mood of the German High Command. In February, von Hindenburg and Ludendorf met the Reichstag in secret session and explained their plan. They promised victory, complete and absolute victory in the field before the autumn. They put the price of such a triumph at a million German lives, and again, later, at a million and a half.

The Allies were in different temper. France could make no new effort. Her manpower was nearing its end, and she could no longer keep her units at full strength. During the winter she broke up over a hundred battalions. The British armies numbered nearly two hundred thousand less than on the same date a year earlier. The Italians were still under the shadow of Caporetto. The Allies were resigned to a defensive campaign until late in the spring when America could take her true place in the line. They believed that they would face a superiority in numbers through German armies released from the Russian front, but they had in the past faced great odds, and they had faith that if the enemy advanced, they could hold out and he would be the weaker when the time came for their final advance.

Field Marshal Haig commanded the British Armies which extended from near San Quentin in an irregular line until, with the Belgian contingent, it touched the English Channel, General Petain commanded the French armies which extended from the British right on to the Swiss frontier. The American 1st, 2nd, 26th and 42nd Divisions were in the trenches down near the Vosges mountains, your 32nd Division had not yet entered the line. Foch was still a member of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, and the unity of command was a thing dreamed of but not thought to be likely.

Such, generally, was the situation and the psychology when the battle of March 21st began. It is of importance to us in our story tonight because the events in and around the Bois de Belleau in which the Second Division and, par-

ticularly, the Marine Brigade took part, grew out of the great German offensive which began on that date.

We might for a moment consider what was the German plan. Ludendorf promised a decision within four months. He promised to isolate the British Army by rolling up its right and driving it into the sea, or pinning it to an entrenched camp between the Somme and the Channel, from which it would only emerge on the signature of the peace. This done, he could hold it with a few troops, swing on the French and put them out of action. His first step was to strike at the junction between Haig and Petain, which he rightly assumed would be a weak point. He had the advantage of interior lines, which facilitated a strategic surprise. In general, he could concentrate in the great salient of which La Fere was the apex, and the Allies would not know on which side of the salient his blow would fall. The country seemed to have been made to order for his purposes. While attacking the British right the Valley of the Oise would protect his flank against the French. The British could be rolled up before the French came to their aid, and they would be out of action before the attack began on the French. Various minor objectives such as Amiens were subsidiary to this main purpose of splitting the Allies, hemming in the British and defeating the French.

The German onslaught covered a front of fifty miles. Within eight days it destroyed the British 5th Army and penetrated to a depth of about forty miles. The enemy cut one railroad into Amiens and crippled the other. They increased the frontage which the Allies were compelled to hold with diminished numbers; they proved that they could break through highly organized defenses; they enormously increased the morale of their own troops, and very seriously lowered that of the British and French. As an incident, Big Bertha began shelling Paris from a distance of 70 miles. The Germans were finally brought to a stand in front of Amiens, the loss of which would have practically separated the British and French armies. The Allies were forced to a unity of command and General Foch emerged from the situation as Allied Commander-in-Chief.

The battle in front of Amiens had scarcely died away when on April 9th the Germans broke through the Lys River near Armentieres. These two great attacks had failed, however, to destroy or pen up the British. The Germans had lost something over half a million men, and the High Command felt that there must be no turning back. Ludendorff still had the strategic initiative and the priceless advantage of interior lines. He had not changed his main purpose and still aimed at separating the British and French armies, and for him the vital terrain was still the Somme. But it was evident that the final blow had been deferred by circumstances, and he resolved to strike in a different area, with the object of exhausting the Allied reserves and stripping their center. Repeated blows at widely separated sectors would compel the moving of Allied supports around the long outer edge of the salient, would certainly afford the Germans local successes and might, in the precarious situation of the Allies, actually give the finishing stroke which would disintegrate their entire defense.

The new terrain must be sufficiently far from the center to make reinforcement difficult, and it must threaten some vital possession of the Allies. He found such an area in the Heights of the Aisne. It was the nearest point to Paris; it was the path to the Marne; and an advance south of that river would cut the Paris-Chalons railways, and threaten the whole French front in Champagne. After the attack near Armentieres had ceased the Allied leaders felt sure that a new German offensive would take place but were uncertain as to where it would fall. It had been thought improbable that the line of the Aisne would be attacked and many French troops had been shifted from there to the British area, leaving but seven small divisions to hold a front of thirty miles. Consequently when the assault came on May 27th between Berry-au-Bac and Anizy-le-Chateau it was a complete surprise.

The Germans carried the Chemin-des-Dames in the first dash and crossed the Aisne on bridges that the French had not had time to destroy. By evening they had crossed the Vesle, and early on the 29th they captured Soissons. On the

morning of the 30th the enemy appeared on the hills above the Marne between Chateau-Thierry and Dormans, and by evening he was in possession of ten miles of the hilly north bank of that historic stream, with some outposts on the southern side. The achievement was brilliant. An advance of over thirty miles in seventy-two hours, between 30,000 and 40,000 prisoners, 400 guns, and ten miles of the Marne bank. This had been accomplished without serious resistance and the hopes of taking Paris ran high in German hearts. France was in consternation, and the Government prepared to leave the capital. The situation was very grave. The French line had been greatly lengthened by the creation of the salient and it bristled with vulnerable points, and there was scanty room to maneuver. Paris was dangerously near, and its loss would mean far more than the usual loss of a capital. In 1914 the city might have fallen without irreparable disaster but in 1916 and 1917 the chief munition factories of the Allies had risen in the environs of Paris. If they were lost the Allied strength would be seriously crippled and after four years of war it was very doubtful if France could replace them. The loss in material had already been severe, for the country between the Aisne and the Marne was full of munition dumps and aerdromes.

The Valley of the Marne is the Holy Land of French arms. For fifteen hundred years it has been the path of approach to Paris taken by invaders from the East. Near Chalons still stands the great oval mound that is called the Camp of Attila, the legendary fortification of the Huns when, in 451 A.D. they broke over the West in that invasion which has passed into history as the symbol of all that is devastating and ruthless, and which gave its chief the mediaeval name of the Scourge of God.

From the eastern slopes of the upper Marne five centuries ago there had come the gentle Joan of Arc to give leadership and heroic inspiration to her people. On one of the northern ridges of the Marne Valley stands the tomb of Kellerman to mark where Valmy turned the tide of the Wars of the French Revolution. A hundred years ago the great Napoleon had in this valley fought the last days of

the Campaign of 1814 which ended in the first abdication and the exile to Elba. In and along this Valley in 1914 had been fought the greatest battle of the Great War, the First Battle of the Marne, and in 1918 the Valley was still fairly dotted with the graves of those who had been killed four years before. South of the Marne is the Brie country noted for the ruins of famous donjons of the past. North of the river there is a land rich in farms and orchards, back of the banks which are hilly and fairly steep in places. The river, hardly a hundred yards wide at Chateau Thierry, is slow-flowing but not fordable and is crossed here and there by stone bridges.

About the middle of May, 1918, the Second Division had been relieved from the Verdun section where it had for several months been holding trenches south of that place. After a week of rest and instruction it had been sent to the neighborhood of Gisors, a town about sixty miles northwest of Paris in the ancient province of Picardy. The 1st Division was already engaged near Montdidier and the 2nd was intended to relieve it. Memorial Day was a holiday with us but the Division had orders to march at dawn on May 31st toward Montdidier. Our holiday was interrupted late in the afternoon by notice that our destination was changed, and by midnight we received orders to have the division, except the artillery, machine guns and animal-drawn transport ready to embark in busses at 5 the next morning, with destination unstated. General officers were directed to proceed by motor car to Meaux where orders would be given them. We all knew of the great attack toward Chateau Thierry, and at times the rumble of the guns could be heard. With that much information and orders for our generals to proceed to Meaux, it took no great prophet to guess that the Second Division was headed for action in front of the German advance towards Paris. The Division was 28,500 strong, only about six thousand less than the Army we took six weeks in getting to Santiago in 1898. There are many details involved in a change of orders for a body of men that size, when received at night about six hours before the busses are to be in line for embarkation. Some hurry, some con-

fusion, not much sleep,—but the busses moved out next morning from the various villages where the troops had been billeted, making, when finally strung out along the highway, a column about fourteen miles long filled with thousands of somewhat conversational, articulate and audible young Americans.

The route led through country where many people, worn and wearied by four years of war, had heard that the Americans had come but had not seen them, and not seeing had not believed. All day long and until late that night the column rolled through little French villages of Old Picardy, touching the ancient Ile de France, skirting the edge of Paris itself, and finally into Champagne and the Valley of the Marne. The moral effect of this movement on the doubting and despairing French who saw it can hardly be overstated. It has its place in song and story both in English and French.

As a brigade commander I took three members of my staff in the more or less infirm motor car assigned to me, and after seeing the column start took the road to Meaux where we arrived early in the afternoon. Meaux was less than ten miles from the advancing Germans, with little between and had been badly bombed by airplanes the night before. Its morale was badly shaken and everybody who could was leaving town. We waited two hours, meanwhile having a hurried luncheon. At the little hotel there was a mass of hungry and insistent French officers; the place crowded, the waiters rattled and the food scarce. I noticed an American lady wearing the YMCA brassard. She was eating luncheon but when she finished she volunteered as a waiter and for the time took over the management of the hotel in our behalf, the proprietor and staff having fled the city. She was Miss Herron of Ohio, a sister of Mrs. William H. Taft. A little later we received orders that my Marine Brigade would go out northeast along the Ourcq River and Canal, and were told that the Germans would probably attack before morning. We left Meaux in every stage of hurried evacuation and ran out along the green valley of the Ourcq on a road every rod of which was covered. All kinds of French units, ar-

tillery at a trot, straggling infantry, lone engineers, Red Cross, trains, trucks, wagons, which congested and sometimes blocked the highway for half an hour at a time making movement impossible. Hundreds of refugees crowded the road and the adjacent fields. Every portable thing that a frightened peasantry would be likely to save from among their little treasures was to be seen along that crowded highway. Probably the flight of Evangeline and the Acadians may have equalled this tragedy, but I doubt that even they carried in their faces the terror shown by these victims fleeing before the German advance.

Meanwhile, we passed many French officers and men all going from and none towards the front. Until nearly dark, when some very goodlooking French cavalry came along, my small party were making the only movement in one direction along that congested highway. We were seeing the motley array which characterizes the rear of a routed army. By 7:40 when I had completed my reconnaissance and determined on my arrangements, the French staff changed our orders, an event that often happened during our experiences with that gifted people. Instead of being disposed along the Ourcq we were to march to the vicinity of Montreuil-aux-Lions and go into position. At dark some of our men had begun to arrive in trucks and to debuss and mingle with the rabble along the crowded highway. Our new destination was still nearly a day's march distant. Our men had been in trucks all day and had little or no sleep the night before. Some of them did not arrive until after 24 hours spent in trucks. My staff and I spent nearly all that night trying to get units of dead-tired Marines assembled and turned in the right direction. I finally got word along the road to bivouac where they stood and that we would move at 4:30 the next morning. Meanwhile, a German plane came along and bombed the highway. It was a busy night.

But even such nights must have an end and, by noon June 1st, the Second Division was arriving along the great Paris-Metz highway near Montreuil-aux-Lions. After we left Picardy the French sent our artillery by rail but decided to march the rolling kitchens by road. That meant no warm

food, or coffee either hot or cold, for several days. Our men marched and counter-marched without sleep the night of May 31st, marched to the lines on June 1st, and finally went into the fight without warm food, and nothing but "canned Willie," and in some cases were 36 hours without food of any kind. In the late afternoon of June 1st, the accident of our position on the road sent my brigade into action north of the Paris-Metz highway, the other brigade being disposed south of it. Within twenty-four hours our first position was extended until it reached from LaThiolet on the high road, northwest through Lucy-le-Bocage, Hill 142, to Champillon and Le Mare Farm, facing northeast.

My battalions moved along the highway in column to near the Ferme Paris, and then obliques across the fields, deploying as they went. The companies were two hundred and fifty men strong, the battalions a thousand, and the brigade eight thousand. The Marine Brigade was a highly trained body of men, hand-picked volunteers, well officered by professional soldiers. My headquarters were established at Yssonge Farm, a house with a red roof, on a little hill, which proved so attractive to shells that three days later I took over La Loge Farm, vacated by the French General when his troops withdrew on June 4th. We were then responsible for what happened on that front, though we served under the French Corps and Army Command for our entire stay in that neighborhood.

The country over which our line ran was rolling, with here and there a group of farm buildings, a few wheat fields, some pasture land, with occasional clumps of timber. The village of Lucy-le-Bocage, with perhaps before the war a population of a thousand people, had been damaged by shell fire before we took it over. Within the month it was destined to become a ruin from the same cause. The Bois de Belleau is an irregular area of timbered land comprising perhaps a square mile. Lucy lay just west of the southern end of the wood; Bouresches was a small village at the southeast corner of it. From Lucy to Belleau a small farm road ran; and from Torcy and Belleau a fairly important road and a railroad ran past the eastern side of the wood through

Bouresches and on to Chateau Thierry, a distance of about five miles. A deep ravine, dry at that time, skirted the southern edge of the wood, crossing the road which connected Lucy-le-Bocage with Paris-Metz highway. Under the stone culvert at this crossing we had one of our advanced dressing stations. A road from Lucy to Bouresches generally paralleled this ravine along the southern end of the wood. About half a mile across the little valley from the north end of the wood was the old Chateau of Belleau, for which the Bois de Belleau had been a hunting preserve. In its northern edge still stood a small hunting lodge. The timber was principally what would be called second growth in this country, but had never been underbrushed, and was a dense tangled mass of undergrowth with here and there a path or wood-road through it. Some small areas had been cut off and the wood piled in cords. The topography of the greater part of the wood, especially the eastern and southern portions was extremely rugged and rocky. Great irregular boulders from half the size of an ordinary bedroom to the size of a touring-car were piled over and against each other as though thrown up by some terrible convulsion in ages past. These afforded shelter for machine gun nests with disposition in depth and often flanking one another, generally so rugged that only direct hits from artillery fire were effective against them. The wood afforded concealment for infantry. It was a strong point for defense. It stood at the southwest angle of the salient which the enemy had made by his advance to the Marne, and was at its closest point to Paris. Occupied by the Allies it barred the further advance of the Germans on the Paris-Metz Road.

The Marine Brigade made its first attack on the Bois de Belleau on June 6th, striking it from the west and south after an artillery preparation very short because of the necessity for surprise. The southern third of the wood came into our possession as did the village of Bouresches, except for the stone railway station and the railroad embankment. There was almost constant fighting in the Wood from June 6th to 25th, but planned attacks were made on the 10th, 11th, 14th, 19th and 25th. At the termination of the latter

action Major Shearer commanding a Marine Battalion reported: "This Wood now exclusively U. S. Marine Corps."

It is not of interest to you to go more into details of this bloody struggle for the Bois de Belleau. When the Second Division went into line on the afternoon of June 1st, on both sides of the Paris-Metz Highway, the French had been retiring along the whole of the Soissons-Rheims front from one to ten miles a day for five days. No unit along that whole front had stood against the foe. The first unit to stand, and it not only stood but went forward, was the Second Division,—the Marine Brigade of which, for nearly a month, was conspicuously active in the Bois de Belleau. The French, as well as our other Allies, were tremendously encouraged. The German High Command revised its previous estimates of American troops and published a new one to the Army:

"The Second American Division must be considered a very good one and may even perhaps be reckoned as a storm troop. The different attacks on the Belleau Woods were carried out with bravery and dash. The moral effect of our own gunfire can not seriously impede the advance of the American infantry. The Americans' nerves are not yet worn out."

The Marine Brigade used up four German divisions during the month of fighting in the Belleau Wood. It lost of its own strength 670 killed and 3,721 wounded on the sunny slopes of Hill 142, in the tangled thickets of the Wood and in the narrow streets of Bouresches. The French Command ordered that forever thereafter the Bois de Belleau should be known as the "Bois de la Brigade de Marine." The Marine Brigade had added another name to Tripoli, Mexico and China, and a score of others that are written on the tablets of Marine history and immortalized in the traditions of the Corps.

"Moments of high crisis pass unnoticed; it is only the historian in later years who can point to a half hour in a crowded day and say that then was decided the fate of a

cause or a people." The stopping of the Germans on the high road to Paris gave the opportunity for the later fighting in July which is now universally recognized as the turning point. It was practically continuous with the operations leading up to the offensive southwest of Soissons on July 18th and 19th. The Germans never again went forward. They had started down the slopes of the bitter road to defeat. As a brilliant British historian, John Buchan, has said: "Four months earlier Ludendorf had stood as the apparent dictator of Europe; four months later he and his master were in exile."

It will soon be ten years since the enemy thundered on the Aisne and the Marne.—One cannot recall those brave days without some swelling of the heart, some dimming of the eye. Most of our men who died in taking that Wood still lie sleeping in the little silent City of marble crosses at its northern end. The day has come when few Americans visit France without making a pilgrimage to the Bois de Belleau, St. Mihiel, the Argonne Forest, the Meuse and the Marne. When the chronicles of the World War are gray with age may our countrymen still visit those shrines, and honor those of their race who there loved country more than mere life. "Though a man die yet shall he live again."

The Dedication of Bois de Belleau

*Address Delivered at Ceremonies on July 22, 1923,
when Marshal Foch for the French Republic
turned over the Battlefield to the Belleau
Wood Association, an American
organization.*

IT IS very appropriate that this shell-torn wood and blood-soaked soil should with the consent of our great sister Republic, pass forever to American ownership. It is too precious in its association; too hallowed with the haunting memories of that fateful June of five years ago to be sheltered under any flag,—no matter how much beloved,—other than our very own. Against it, like an island in a storm-swept sea, beat the high tide of the German advance in those summer days, and now in the quiet sunshine of a happier summer it is become a tiny American Island, surrounded by lovely France.

Insignificant in area, out of the ordinary track of travel, not especially picturesque, and with no particular traditions of past peace or war, this ancient hunting preserve of the Chateau of Belleau, came into the spot-light of history by being at the spearhead of the German thrust for Paris in the last week of May, 1918. For a short period the music of its sonorous name was heard in all Allied lands, and for its brief day it held the headlines throughout the world. The great crises of history pass unheeded by the actors in the drama, and it is not until after the event that the historian can say that a particular hour on a crowded day was heavily charged with fate. The accident of place, the chance stroke of a zero-hour wrote the name of the Bois de Belleau on the records, and with it chronicled the immortal fame of the Marine Brigade.

There were no better troops than our Marines in any Army, and it is fitting that for this Memorial to the Amer-

ican arms, there should be chosen this battlefield where they fought with such desperate valor, and to redeem which so many of them gave their lives. The Marine Brigade was placed in line of the afternoon of June 1st. Their front extended from Thiolet Farm on the Paris-Metz highway, through Lucy-le-Bocage, and over Hill 142 to beyond Marigny, and Champillon. It roughly followed the southern edge of the valley and faced towards Bouresches, Belleau and Torcy. For several days there was nearly continuous fighting as the enemy tried in vain to gain ground toward Paris. On the 6th of June the Marines made the first attack on the Germans in this wood and in the village of Bouresches. Berry's battalion fought its way through to the Belleau-Bouresches road, and Sibley's battalion captured the southern end of the wood, and took the little town. The fighting was practically continuous until June 25th, when the last German was driven out and Shearer reported "This wood now exclusively U. S. Marine Corps." A few days later the French Commander, General Degoutte, officially re-named the wood to be known forever on all French maps as the Bois de la Brigade de Marine. There were killed in and around this wood 670 officers and men of the Marine Brigade, and 3721 were wounded. The slain were in the proportion of about one to every five wounded, while the usual battle ratio is one killed to every seven or eight wounded. This means that many wounded Marines remained in the fight until killed by a second or third wound.

I may perhaps be forgiven if this ceremony today brings to me more clearly than to some of you, the half-blurred vision of that other summer. In fancy I can still see the splendid columns in forest-green deploying across the fields from the great highway between Paris and Metz; in memory I endure once more the suspense of those days and nights, and am torn again by the consciousness of the cost at which this wood was taken. Who better than I should know that the men who poured out the red wine of life on these slopes, were the very flower of our race, the straightest of limb, the keenest of vision and the most dauntless of spirit! !

This melancholy spot with its tangle of wildwood, its giant boulders, its mangled trees, with here and there the wreckage of war, a helmet, a rusty canteen, or perhaps in some lonely forest aisle the still tangible evidence of deadly hand-to-hand struggle, will for all time be a shrine for pilgrims from beyond the western ocean. Mothers will consecrate this ground with their tears; fathers with grief tempered with pride will tell its story to their younger generation. Now and then a veteran, for the brief span in which we shall still survive, will come here to live again those brave days of that distant June. Here will be raised the altars of patriotism; here will be renewed the vows of sacrifice and consecration to country. Hither will come our countrymen in hours of depression and even of failure, and take new courage from the shrine of great deeds.

The Chattanooga War Memorial

*Address at Chattanooga, Tennessee, February 22nd, 1924,
at dedication of "The Soldiers and Sailors Memorial
Auditorium," erected by the City of Chattanooga
and County of Hamilton, Tennessee.*

FROM a world that is largely given over to complacency and self-satisfaction, busy with the problems of the new life that has followed the Great War, in a country careless of the future and heedless of the past, this splendid gathering has come together to testify to the world, that no matter how short the memory or how brief the regret of other communities, the City of Chattanooga remembers and honors its sons who die in the war.

Of the men who went to the Great War from this charming Southern City, one hundred and sixty never returned. While your Roll of Honor bears the names of more than one racial strain, it is strong in the good old English names that mark the region of Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky as the remaining stronghold of the ancient stock from which our best traditions and our political institutions have sprung,—the stock that over a century ago crossed the mountains from the Old Dominion and the two Carolinas. Your Roll of Honor reads like a leaf from the Parish Records of Eighteenth Century England. Your people speak the language of Shakespeare more purely than in any other region of our great country, and have preserved their Anglo-Saxon heritage of blood, which, in some other parts of America, has become but a name and a memory.

As one born in the North, but whose paternal ancestors were in that emigration which crossed the mountains from Virginia, I am persuaded that you of the South approached our participation in the Great War with more of the spirit of sacrifice, than did your Northern brothers. The meaning of war was a very real one to the South. Within the memory

of men still living, your own fair land had been devastated by the march of invading armies. Your own Chattanooga hills had echoed to the sound of the cannon in some of the bloodiest battles ever fought by men of any race. The ruin of northern France, the sufferings of Belgium, and the tragedy of a refugee population appealed to Southern hearts and recalled to you the half-blurred memory of a more distant war. Less affected by the miscellaneous immigrations that have diluted the blood of the North; warmed by southern suns which, in all ages, have nourished sentiment and sympathy, your people were moved by the crusader spirit to avenge the wrongs of France, which is, to the great majority of Americans, the land next dearest to our own. The South, better than we of the North, comprehended the regeneration that can come only through blood sacrifice, and sent her gallant sons to the war with fullest knowledge of all that it might mean for them and for those who sent them.

This splendid edifice is more than a Memorial to those who died in the war. It is a monument to a clean, high-minded American strain that so lived their lives that they culminated in our generation in these young men of Hamilton County who, full of the unbought grace of life, went forth to the Great War in high pride and devotion, challenging death with a smiling face.

The story of these men of yours is that of the machine gunner, the artilleryman, the cavalryman, the aviator by land and sea, the sailor and marine, the heroic ambulance driver, and the immortal American doughboy. Some of them served in old regular regiments of our army, some in regiments created for and ended with the Great War. Eleven of your dead boys belonged, with me, to the Second Division, and nine of them to my Marine Brigade. Others are immortalized in the legends of the French Foreign Legion, and of British battalions, ancient in history and rich in tradition, for Chattanooga men were falling in battle on the Western Front before their country entered the war. Not all of these sons of the South were of our own proud and conquering race. But the levelling of their sacrificial service takes little note of race or creed. No matter what their ancestry, proud

or humble, bond or free, they all died as Americans to hand down to other ages the blessings of liberty. To those who fell, I offer the tribute of the shining words of Napier: "No man died that day with more honor; though many died, and there was much honor."

These boys of yours were actors in the greatest drama the world has ever seen. They played their part in a very splendid and immortal setting. Their Theatre was the ancient battleground of the Marne, the Aisne, the Aire and the Ourcq, a region consecrated by the blood of the gallant French since the remote centuries when France had her national beginnings. The footlights of that vast stage were the flashes of a line of Allied Artillery that ran from the English Channel to the Swiss frontier. Its orchestral music was the reverberations of thousands of Allied guns. Their audience was the millions of the Allied World. Their applause must be, to the latest generation, the gratitude of those for whose liberties these men died.

The sacrifice of these your sons, has brought to Chattanooga the name of battlefields scattered through fifteen centuries of history. The Fields of Flanders, the Bois de Belleau, Chateau Thierry, Soissons, St. Mihiel, the heights of the Meuse and the wooded hills of the Argonne are forever linked to your Chattanooga Roll of Honor.

I am not unmindful of hearts that ache today, and of tears that flow for boys who went to the war and never came back. But I cannot conceive of your sorrow as untempered by resignation, or of your sacrifice as endured without pride. I may, perhaps, be forgiven if there fills my heart this morning, the memory of one of my own gallant Marines, John W. Overton of Tennessee. He was descended of a family that has lived at Overton Hall near Nashville, since our Government issued its first land patent to his ancestors. A graduate of Yale, champion long-distance runner of his time, an athlete of all-American fame, he was loved and admired by all who knew him. A true son of your great State, a type, let us believe, of all those to whom this Memorial has been erected, he fell on the slopes of Vierzy, near Soissons, on July 19th, 1918, killed by an enemy shell while gallantly

leading his platoon in our attack on the German lines. Last of his race, he died in the very morning of his life, and the Overton name disappears from the future annals of his well-loved Tennessee. Gallant son of the Old South, typical of the sacrifice which she has so often made, his death should but strengthen our faith in the Precious Promise that, though a man die, yet shall he live again.

In solemn beauty there rise before us today the wonderful, tender lines of this Memorial shrine created for the worship of all that is best in American life. A hundred generations from now it will still echo to the story of the gallantry of the sons of Chattanooga and of Hamilton County. Poets, orators and singers will, by their matchless talent, immortalize that story. Here, too, will be found at once the inspiration of ambitious youth and the theme of reminiscent age. This will be a rallying-point for civic virtue, for better government and higher ideals. Here the memory of those that are gone will plead with the living in support of those principles for which they died. In this soil will germinate the future sources of patriotic pride. Here, it may be that contending factions will harmonize their differences under the influence of the spirit of unity which moved your men. Within this sacred hall should be hushed the voices of greed, of speculation, of prejudice and of injustice. Here Faith will be revived and Hope will again spring eternal. From this spot will swing back the reaction which has swayed our country from the noble sentiments with which its heart throbbed in that fateful summer of 1918. Here apathy and indifference will give way to living interest. In this temple of memory the standards that have been unconsciously lowered will once more be raised. The atmosphere of this sacred place will be fatal to the germs of political decay. At this shrine will be renewed the vows of friendship with that gallant country in whose soil so many of our boys now lie in dreamless sleep. Here will be pledged a proper gratitude to the disabled surviving comrades of those who died. On these altars the sacred fires of patriotism will be kept burning. Generations of noble Southern women will consecrate this temple with their tears.

It is a very splendid Memorial which you are dedicating to the memory of your gallant sons. Yet are we within the shadow of a higher and a better monument builded by the lives your young men lived and the deaths they died. Duty, Honor, Patriotism, Sacrifice,—around us rise the invisible walls of a Memorial not built by hands. From the little mounds of dreamless dust scattered over your broad south-land, from the hills and valleys of France, and from beneath the restless sea, speak the spirits of those whose sacrifice made this Greater Memorial possible. The ideals which flashed before their dying vision in the last moments of life, are confided to the keeping of you who survive,—Our country,—her greatness,— the purity of her public life,—the sacredness of her free institutions,—and her duty in a war-worn world.



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